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SEPARATING CONTRACT AND PROMISE 
ADITI BAGCHI* 
ABSTRACT 
 Contract has been conceptualized as a species of promise. This prevailing approach 
obscures essential differences between legally binding and everyday, or “private,” promises. 
The moral character of a private promise depends on the fact that it is not only freely made 
but also freely kept. Contractual promises are not intended to have and do not have this 
voluntary character. 
 In making a private promise, a promisor creates a sufficient reason to perform the con-
tent of her promise: the very fact of her promise. To the extent she simultaneously creates a 
second sufficient reason—liability in the case of breach—the first reason does no work, or 
there is no way to confirm the independent sufficiency of the first reason. Similarly, in the 
private practice of promise, the fact of promise is itself the ground for the promisee’s belief 
that the promisor will perform. To the extent the promisee is given independent assurance of 
performance, she cannot objectively rely on the fact of promise alone. The very act of con-
tracting removes one from the moral world of private promise. 
 By better appreciating the difference between contract and private promise, we can bet-
ter mark the appropriate domain of contract law. Where overlap with the domain of private 
promise is justified, as in the regulation of marriage, appreciating the tension between pri-
vate and legal promise may help explain why the extension of contract has been difficult to 
achieve in practice. It also suggests that we can mitigate the conflict between private and 
legal promise by minimizing their overlap. This can be done by limiting the remedies for 
breach to ones that the private promise did not contemplate. In other contexts, the distinction 
between private and legal promise calls for the expansion of the domain of contract. For 
example, some promises made in the context of radical inequality in power, as in most em-
ployment circumstances, are located outside the law. To the extent we see the depersonaliza-
tion of the employment relationship as an important achievement of the liberal market econo-
my, the account here clarifies one task of contract law: the displacement of private promise in 
the realm of employment. 
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 Contract has been conceptualized as a species of promise. Most 
famously, Charles Fried has argued that contracts should be enforced 
because they are promises.1 More recently, Daniel Markovits has de-
fended a theory of contract that takes contract to be a special case of 
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Law School; M.Sc. 2000, Oxford University; A.B. 1999, Harvard University. Many thanks 
to Jules Coleman, Scott Shapiro, and others who provided feedback at the Yale-Stanford 
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 1. See generally CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981). 
708  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:707 
 
  
promise,2 and Seana Shiffrin has suggested ways in which the obliga-
tions of contract and promise diverge, a problem only because those 
subject to contractual obligations are ostensibly also subject to the 
norms of promise.3 As Shiffrin and others have pointed out, “U.S. 
contract law represents that a contract is an enforceable promise” 
and “[t]he language of promises, promisees, and promisors saturates 
contract law” and its surrounding literature.4 
 Treating contractual promise as a kind of promise highlights cer-
tain important aspects of contracting, including the communication 
of a commitment to future action and the delegation of partial au-
thority over future conduct to another person. Contract and promise 
do not uniquely share those features; one might communicate a 
commitment to future action that is not intended to benefit the per-
son to whom the commitment is communicated, and the communica-
tion might not amount to either contract or promise. Similarly, one 
might delegate authority over some future decision upward or down-
ward without it amounting to either contract or promise. Contract 
and promise also differ in fundamental ways that I will explore in 
this Article. But it is clear that contract and promise on their faces 
seem to belong to some family, even if each simultaneously has 
equally close or closer relations with other kinds of acts. 
 Perhaps because of their familial relations, the similarities be-
tween contract and promise are too easily assumed and often over-
emphasized. The result has been to obscure essential differences be-
tween legally binding and everyday, or what I will call “private,” 
promises. The moral character of a private promise depends on the 
fact that it is not only freely made but also freely kept. Most contrac-
tual promises are not intended to have and (by definition) do not 
have this voluntary character.5 
                                                 
 2. See Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1448 
(2004) (arguing that “[c]ontract presents a special case of promise” and that contract is a 
“class of promises”). 
 3. See generally Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 
120 HARV. L. REV. 708 (2007). 
 4. Id. at 721. 
 5. Dori Kimel has made a related point. He has suggested that the keeping of prom-
ises and reliance on promises communicates trust and that enforceability interferes with 
this expression.  
By systematically creating powerful reasons to refrain in the first place from 
conduct which amounts to harming the other party, enforceability casts a thick 
and all-encompassing veil over parties’ motives and attitudes towards each 
other, thus leaving reliance, performance, and other aspects of contractual con-
duct largely devoid of expressive content—the kind of expressive content that 
promissory conduct so typically possesses.  
Dori Kimel, Neutrality, Autonomy, and Freedom of Contract, 21 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 473, 
491 (2001) [hereinafter Kimel, Neutrality]; see also DORI KIMEL, FROM PROMISE TO CONTRACT: 
TOWARDS A LIBERAL THEORY OF CONTRACT 29 (2005) [hereinafter KIMEL, PROMISE]. 
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 My goal in this Article is not to catalogue the various similarities 
and differences, as though to demarcate the fuzzy boundaries of the 
circle of contract as it is situated in a larger circle of promise. Nor do 
I purport to have discovered a logical incompatibility between con-
tract and promise; indeed, I take for granted that contract is a spe-
cies of promise. Rather, I will argue that, in an important sense, con-
tract and private promise are in tension with one another. My aim is 
to demonstrate a natural tendency on the part of contract, when lay-
ered on promise, to undermine the value of private promise. The rea-
sons for enforcing contract are sometimes taken to be derivative from 
the reasons to keep one’s promise, or the reasons to support an insti-
tution of promise are taken to be reasons to support an institution of 
contract. Contractual obligation is then thought to reinforce promis-
sory obligation. But private promises which are given the status of 
contract are not thereby elevated. A private promise marked as con-
tractual actually loses (at least some of) its promissory quality. The 
reasons for keeping and relying upon a private promise are in part 
replaced, rather than merely augmented, by the reasons for keeping 
and relying upon a contract. 
 In most contracts, one of the two following scenarios is likely: In 
the first, the agreement between contractual promisor and contrac-
tual promisee is not taken to be an exchange of private promise, and 
thus the law readily recognizes it as a contract. In the second, be-
cause the agreement between the promisor and promisee is of a char-
acter that the law is reluctant to imbue with legal status, the parties 
must go out of their way to signal that theirs is a legal rather than a 
private affair. In both scenarios, the promisor essentially opts out of 
the private practice of promising when she assigns to a third party 
the authority to coerce performance of her promise. Similarly, the 
promisee essentially opts out of the practice of promising by demand-
ing or accepting that what would otherwise be a private promise is 
instead converted to a legally binding commitment. 
 Why does contract begin where private promise ends? Because the 
objective reasons that apply to promisor and promisee are replaced 
once what was a promise is subject to legal intervention. In making a 
private promise, a promisor ordinarily creates a sufficient reason to 
perform the content of her promise: the very fact of her promise.6 To 
                                                 
 6. The promise will not always be a sufficient reason. It can be overcome by other 
reasons, including reasons pertaining to the interests of third parties and, as discussed 
below, reasons relating to the interests of the promisor herself. 
 Characterizing the promise as a sufficient reason to perform does not imply that this 
exhaustively describes the proper structure of the promisor’s reasoning; I will not attempt 
such an account here. I note, though, that the effect of the promise may also be to exclude 
certain other reasons, as argued by Joseph Raz. See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND 
NORMS (1990); Joseph Raz, Reasons for Action, Decisions and Norms, 84 MIND 481, 492-94 
(1975). For example, reasons that speak to whether the promisor has reason to do anything 
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the extent she simultaneously creates a second sufficient reason—
liability in the case of breach—the first reason does no work, or there 
is no way for the independent sufficiency of the first reason to mani-
fest itself objectively.  
 Similarly, when making a private promise, the promisor gives the 
promisee ground for belief that the promisor will perform: again, the 
fact of promise. To the extent the promisee is given independent as-
surance of performance, she cannot objectively rely on the fact of 
promise alone. Because private promises, but not all promises, are 
intended not only to assume obligation but to communicate the reor-
dering of interests in which that obligation consists, it is important 
for the reasons created by private promise to do observable work for 
both promisor and promisee. 
 Some contractual promises coexist with private promises of the 
same content. But their coexistence is uneasy, because invoking the 
specter of the law undermines the moral commitment contained in a 
promise from the perspective of both promisor and promisee. The 
content of that commitment is possible only within a close personal 
relationship. It entails a combining of interests that were previously 
separately held by promisor and promisee. In a private promise, the 
promisor undertakes to give the promisee’s relevant interests weight 
equal to or greater than her own. Contract, by contrast, turns on the 
separateness of these interests. The specter of legal liability creates a 
reason for performance that stems from the separateness rather than 
the unity of interests between promisor and promisee. A sincere in-
tent on the part of the promisor to perform for reasons unrelated to 
legal obligation does not dissipate this tension any more than a sin-
cere intent on the part of the more powerful party in a dispute to re-
solve that dispute fairly would render her unilateral decision just. 
 The tension between contracting and private promising is evident 
when one considers which commitments usually take the contractual 
form. The typical contract is a commercial, arm’s length bargain, and 
those are the agreements the law most readily recognizes as contrac-
tual. The law is reluctant to enforce commitments made within the 
context of personal relationships, i.e., in precisely those contexts in 
which one would expect private promise to reign. To the extent con-
tract liability—and not the unity of interests accomplished by promise—
might either motivate the promisor to perform or assure the promisee 
of performance, any accompanying personal promise is corrupted. 
                                                                                                                  
for the promisee might be excluded. But on my account, the exclusionary effect is perhaps 
narrower than contemplated by Raz. The promise does not, for example, exclude considera-
tions of all first order reasons that went into the making of the promise, such as the incon-
venience created by performance. 
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 My aim is not to characterize private promise as more valuable 
than contract, but rather to suggest that by appreciating the differ-
ence between them, we can better mark the appropriate domain of 
contract law. I hope to offer an account of the relationship between 
contract and private promise that better accounts for everyday prac-
tice and intuition, as well as existing law. But as our practices and 
intuitions regarding promise vary considerably, and as the principles 
motivating various legal rules are ambiguous, my purpose is also to 
offer an attractive model of contract’s relations with related promis-
sory practices with which we can critically assess doctrine. We can 
then refine doctrine to better support valuable moral practices and to 
undermine morally repugnant ones. 
 To a large extent, existing rules already wisely limit the applica-
tion of contract law to most private promises. Where overlap with the 
domain of private promise is justified, as in the regulation of mar-
riage, appreciating the tension between private and legal promise 
may help explain why the justified extension of contract has been dif-
ficult to achieve in practice.7 It also suggests that we can mitigate the 
conflict between private and legal promise by minimizing their over-
lap. This can be done in part by limiting the remedies for breach to 
ones that the private promise did not contemplate. In the context of 
personal relationships, this justifies the award of reliance damages 
rather than either expectation damages or specific performance. Re-
liance damages redress the injury inflicted by breach of the promise, 
in which the state may have a legitimate interest, but do not have 
the effect of either coercing performance or rendering the promisee 
indifferent to performance. 
 In other contexts, the distinction between private and legal prom-
ise calls for an expansion of the domain of contract. For example, 
promises made in the context of radical inequality in power, as in 
most employment circumstances, are often located outside the law. A 
promisor with vastly superior bargaining power need not promise in 
the contractual form in order to induce the desired conduct by the 
promisee; the promisor has no incentive to submit the unequal rela-
tionship to legal authority. “Downward” promises between hierarchi-
cally situated persons are not easily enforced by the state. Thus, per-
formance of those promises usually remains at the discretion of the 
promisor. Such promises are false private promises. To the extent we 
see the depersonalization of the employment relationship as an im-
portant achievement of the liberal market economy, this account clar-
ifies one task of contract law: the displacement of private promise in 
                                                 
 7. My argument for avoiding the enforcement of private promise addresses only 
“promissory” theories of promissory estoppel, not reliance-based theories. Reliance, or 
harm-based, considerations are among the public policy reasons that should motivate en-
forcement of certain kinds of private promise. 
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the realm of employment. Contract law should bend over backwards 
to bring such promises into the fold. 
 I will begin in Part I by presenting my central argument with re-
spect to the relation between contract and promise in greater detail. 
Also in that Part, I will explore the distinct moral character of con-
tract and assess (and reject) certain objections to my approach. I aim 
to present a fairly detailed conception of what private promise en-
tails, but the thrust of my argument does not depend on the plausi-
bility of those details. While I present a view of private promising in 
which a promisor commits to treating the promisee’s related interests 
as equal to or greater than those of the promisor, the remainder of 
my argument requires the reader to agree only that the moral value 
of promising depends on voluntary performance. 
 After my discussion of the tension between promise and contract, I 
will consider the implications of the moral separateness of contract 
and private promise for contract law. In Part II, I will explore the 
implications for the regulation of private promise, including those 
cases where the state has a compelling reason not to cede territory to 
private norms altogether. I will suggest that, where it is necessary to 
regulate private promise, the state can minimize interference by of-
fering excuses and remedies that differ from those in the private 
norm regime. In Part III, I consider another type of uneasy coexistence: 
cases of hollow private promise where the extralegal status of prom-
ising reflects oppression rather than ethical flourishing. In these cas-
es, private promise is the one that should make room for contract. 
 At this point it is worth pausing to clarify certain basic features of 
the argument here. First, while I am critical of certain aspects of ex-
isting doctrine, on the whole, I believe my account of the tension be-
tween contract and promise is consistent with contemporary trends 
in contract law and related fields. Second, given that I see contract 
and private promise as fundamentally different, I do not follow 
those who argue that contract law is or should be patterned on prom-
issory norms. But nor am I arguing that, because contract and promise 
are fundamentally different, promissory norms should have nothing 
to do with contract law. I agree with Shiffrin that we should start 
from the premise that “law must be made compatible with the condi-
tions for moral agency to flourish.”8 Unlike Shiffrin, I believe that 
                                                 
 8. Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 712. Shiffrin calls her own approach accommodationist 
and distinguishes it from reflective and separatist approaches. A reflective approach seeks 
to model contractual obligations on moral ones, while a separatist believes that because 
contract has its own goals and purposes, “[t]heir pursuit does not require engagement with 
other moral concerns.” Id. at 713. 
2011]  SEPARATING CONTRACT AND PROMISE 713 
 
contract law’s accommodation of promise usually entails steering 
clear of private promise.9 
 Finally, my approach is consistent with a largely economic ap-
proach to contract. A normative defense of the economic approach, 
however, calls for something more than an attempt to justify the pur-
suit of welfare or the satisfaction of preferences. There are few that 
would discount the moral value of promoting welfare, satisfying most 
preferences, or even increasing aggregate wealth. It is implausible 
that these are not legitimate ends of state activity. The problem, 
where there is one, arises when there is a prior moral principle that 
must be satisfied before the state is free to pursue welfare. There are 
such principles, but those which have been sometimes taken to satu-
rate contract law, leaving little or no room for efficiency concerns, are 
misguided. They generally stem from theories of promise which take 
contract to be within their undifferentiated territory. If the economic 
approach has thus far been taken to compete with moral theories of 
promise, my aim is to suggest that while both contract and private 
promise have rich moral import, their respective moral significance is 
best revealed in contrast.  
I.   THE SEPARATE DOMAINS OF CONTRACT AND PRIVATE PROMISE 
A.   The Character of Private Promising 
 Charles Fried has argued that the principle of autonomy requires 
that individuals be able to bind themselves by promising.10 In Con-
tract as Promise he wrote this: 
In order that I be as free as possible, that my will have the great-
est possible range consistent with the similar will of others, it is 
necessary that there be a way in which I may commit myself. It is 
necessary that I be able to make nonoptional a course of conduct 
that would otherwise be optional for me. By doing this I can facili-
tate the projects of others, because I can make it possible for those 
others to count on my future conduct, and thus those others can 
pursue more intricate, more far-reaching projects.11 
Autonomy, on the part of both promisor and promisee, is promoted by 
a practice of promising.12 Fried is primarily concerned with the au-
                                                 
 9. Cf. Joseph Raz, Promises in Morality and Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 916, 933 (1982)  
(reviewing P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW (1981)) (“One protects the practice of 
undertaking voluntary obligations by preventing its erosion—by making good any harm 
caused by its use or abuse.”). 
 10. CHARLES FRIED, supra note 1, at 14-17. 
 11. Id. at 13. 
 12. Fried was generally focused on the autonomy interests of the promisor. But as this 
passage suggests, the autonomy interests of the promisee are also implicated. Kimel sug-
gests a way in which those interests might be taken into account. In discussing the case 
Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (1921), Kimel suggests that “[t]he question that 
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tonomy interests of the promisor, and he views enforcing promises as 
a required form of respect toward the promisor.13 But given that 
promising promotes promisors’ autonomy because it expands their 
capacity to shape their normative world, any state action that makes 
it more difficult for them to set the terms of their relations with other 
moral agents diminishes rather than enhances their autonomy. I 
suggest here that by enforcing certain promises, the state makes it 
more difficult for individuals to make private promises. 
 But before I attempt to show why enforcing a private promise may 
undermine autonomy rather than enhance it, it is useful to identify 
an important jump in Fried’s own argument.14 The fact that autono-
my may require that I “be able to make nonoptional a course of con-
duct that would otherwise be optional for me”15 does not, until the 
meaning of “nonoptional” is clarified, suggest in any way that the 
course of conduct must be made illegal. Any number of obstacles 
might remove a course of conduct as an option. Impossibility is one. 
Prohibitively high costs, including social sanction and reputation 
loss, is another. Immorality and illegality are other dispositive rea-
sons to forego a course of conduct.  
 It may be unduly burdensome if people can only make binding 
commitments by rendering nonperformance impossible or highly 
costly for themselves. But promising is an easy way to make conduct 
nonoptional for people in contexts where they believe their promises 
are morally binding and feel bound by moral principles. Whether le-
gal liability is a higher or lower hurdle to changing one’s mind than 
                                                                                                                  
should be asked in analyzing such a case form the perspective of personal autonomy is just 
how significant an expression of autonomy is a person’s wish to have his house equipped 
with ‘Reading’ pipes rather than with virtually identical pipes of a different make.” Kimel, 
Neutrality, supra note 5, at 484. The idea is that a liberal committed to enforcing promises 
because they are an expression of personal autonomy need not defer to not-so-important 
promises, or ones which do not implicate the autonomy interests of the promisee. Kimel 
seeks to save liberals from the libertarians, that is, to explain why morally problematic 
promises—including ones that are morally problematic in light of complex social con-
cerns—may be taken off the table without violating core liberal principles. 
 13. “If we decline to take seriously the assumption of an obligation . . . to that extent we 
do not take [the promisor] seriously as a person.” CHARLES FRIED, supra note 1, at 20-21. 
 14. Randy Barnett seems to make a similar move when he argues that “freedom to 
contract . . . stipulates that persons should have the power to alter by their consent their 
legal relations.” Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems with Contract as Promise, 77 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1022, 1023-24 (1992). It is not clear why freedom of contract should be defined thus 
or, in particular, how this conception of freedom of contract follows from the moral value of 
our capacity to enter moral commitments. In any case, it is worth noting that, as I am only 
addressing the default rules of enforceability, there is nothing in what I am saying that 
would preclude the law from recognizing as enforceable certain private promises where the 
promisor and promisee jump through enough hoops. Thus, under my approach, nobody 
would lack the ability to render a commitment binding where the other party consented to 
that arrangement; but as the relationship between the parties appears more intimate, the 
parties would have to do more to definitively demonstrate that they intend their arrange-
ments to have legal force. 
 15. CHARLES FRIED, supra note 1, at 13. 
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moral constraint may vary from person to person as an empirical 
matter; but, as a normative matter, a moral principle requiring the 
performance of promises may suffice in certain contexts to enable in-
dividuals to bind themselves and, more generally, to shape their 
moral world. In fact, the alteration of the moral status of one’s future 
choices is probably the most important aspect of private promises.16 
Moral agency consists in one’s ability to change one’s own and other’s 
normative status, i.e., the rights and obligations we have against 
each other.17 But there is nothing in moral agency per se that re-
quires corresponding legal agency.18 
 This shows only that enforcing promises is not necessary to enable 
prospective promisors to exercise moral autonomy. It does not, how-
ever, address the autonomy interests of promisees, who would benefit 
from greater assurance that their reliance is not misplaced, and it 
does not deny that enforcing promises might thereby indirectly pro-
mote promisors’ autonomy (because their choices, too, will expand as 
a result of promisee assurance). It may be that moral autonomy is 
well served by the enforcement of many kinds of promises, notably 
promises to strangers. The heart of my argument is that, whatever 
its advantages, enforcing private promises is in other respects too 
costly from a moral point of view to justify the legal enforcement of 
those promises in the usual case. 
 The moral cost of enforcing private promises stems from the char-
acter of the relationships within which those promises are usually 
made. Not all noncommercial promises are made within the context 
of personal relationships, but most are.19 Most people do not make 
                                                 
 16. Cf. Thomas Scanlon, Promises and Practices, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 199, 211 (1990) 
(“[W]hen I say ‘I promise to help you if you help me,’ the reason I suggest to you that I will 
have for helping is just my awareness of the fact that not to return your help would, under 
the circumstances, be wrong: not just forbidden by some social practice, but morally wrong.”). 
 17. Cf. Joseph Raz, Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers, in NORMATIVITY 
AND NORMS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON KELSENIAN THEMES 468 (Stanley L. Paulson & 
Bonnie Litschewski Paulson eds., Bonnie Litschewski Paulson et al. trans., 1998) (“[T]o the 
extent that promises are a source of voluntary obligations they are made by the exercise of 
normative powers.”). 
 18. The power to change one’s legal status may effectively enhance moral agency in 
some contexts. The question here is whether promising is one of those cases; I argue it 
is not. At the least, exercising legal agency through private promising does not enhance 
moral agency. 
 19. Barbara Fried, Is as Ought: The Case of Contracts, 92 VA. L. REV. 1375, 1382 
(2006) (suggesting that most people view promises “as continuous . . . with status relation-
ships”). Even Markovits, who sees contract as an instance of promise among strangers who 
cease to be strangers, acknowledges that promise is more likely (or at least, the reasons for 
making promises are greater and more compelling) between those who are already in-
volved with one another in some way. See Markovits, supra note 2, at 1437. While he rec-
ognizes that his moral theory of promising is “most suited to personal, benevolent promis-
es,” he does not go the road of focusing on personal promises. Id. at 1449-50. Markovits 
describes the duty to enter into promises as an imperfect duty, sometimes more perfect 
than others.  
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self-styled promises to strangers. One might stop there and under-
stand a private promise just as a promise which, unlike a contractual 
promise, feeds off of the special relationship that caused the promisor 
to make her promise in the first place. 
 But equally as important as the effect of the relationship on the 
initial decision to make a promise is the relationship’s effect on the 
nature of the promise likely to be made. It is often observed by those 
of varying views of promising that a promise creates or adds to the 
relationship between promisor and promisee.20 We should distinguish 
between the effect of the promise on the relationship and the moral 
effect of the relationship on the promise, i.e., how the nature of the moral 
commitment embodied in a promise between intimates differs from 
the nature of a moral commitment made by one stranger to another. 
 Because a promise represents a voluntary undertaking, a promisor’s 
intentions are critical to determining the content of her promise.21 
But a promisor will not normally spell out the intended normative 
consequences of her promise. Rather, she invokes a convention, 
which is in turn used by others—including her promisee—to under-
stand the nature and scope of her commitment. Elaborating the 
commitment is in part an exercise in the interpretation of the promi-
sor’s communicative acts, but because a promisor by definition par-
takes in a preexisting convention of promise, she cannot fully control 
the content of that commitment short of abandoning the practice of 
promise altogether. A promise made within the context of a private 
relationship, unless expressly identified as something other than a 
private promise, will normally obligate the promisor according to 
promissory norms applicable to such private promises. 
 Unsurprisingly, the moral commitment made by an intimate is in 
some ways greater than that by a stranger. Perhaps surprisingly, in 
other respects, the moral commitment implied by a promise within a 
                                                 
 20. See, e.g., STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 56-58 (2004) (taking the position 
that promises are intrinsically valuable because they create a special relationship between 
promisor and promisee); Raz, supra note 9, at 929 (“[V]oluntary undertakings play an im-
portant role in the development of all [personal] relations, however formed, and their viola-
tion is often a cause or a sign of the loosening or disintegration of the relationship.”). 
 21. Thus, whether a promise commits the promisor to performing under X conditions 
turns on whether the promisor intended to undertake an obligation to perform under X 
conditions. See Steven Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, 56 EMORY L.J. 439, 443 
(2006). However, without attempting to resolve here whether or to what extent the content 
of the promise is controlled by the promisor’s subjective intention, the promisee’s predicta-
ble understanding of that intention, or a reasonable observer’s interpretation of the prom-
ise, I presume here that (1) the express words of a promise will not alone suffice to decide 
the scope of the commitment under all conditions (i.e., all promises are incomplete promis-
es) and (2) a commitment specified such that it departs radically from any familiar form of 
promise fails as a promise and is best understood as a commitment short of promise. From 
these assumptions it follows that we can expect common promissory norms to inform the 
nature of the commitment undertaken in a promise. Those norms will be relevant to any 
construction of promissory intent. 
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close relationship is less rigorous. Experience belies the frequent, im-
plicit claim that a promise is the functional equivalent of an inexora-
ble command to perform; it alters but does not eliminate deliberation 
at the stage of performance. While even a private promise involves a 
delegation of authority to the promisee, it is only a partial delegation 
of authority in a narrow sense. The obligation created by a private 
promise is not simply to perform a specified action, but to regard the 
decision whether to perform that act, in the future, in a particular 
manner. A private promisor is normally obligated to give greater 
weight to her promisee’s interests than her own—how much greater 
weight will depend on the nature of the promise and the relation-
ships within which it takes place. 
 Because the weight we are obligated to give each other’s interests 
is an important dimension of our normative relations to one another, 
a private promise does alter the promisor’s normative status vis-à-vis 
her promisee. Inasmuch as she must defer not only to the promisee’s 
interests but also the promisee’s understanding of those interests, 
because those will control the specific content of her duty, she has 
indeed delegated partial authority over her future action. But the 
promisor herself has not ceded authority over her future actions en-
tirely. The promise will require deliberation to execute. The promisor 
must consider not just whether to keep the promise, but what exactly 
the promise requires of her once future facts reveal themselves. She 
is, however, bound to regard those future facts differently than she 
likely would in the absence of her promise. 
 We can capture the normal content of a private promise this way: 
When A promises to do X for B, where A and B are close, A promises 
to treat B’s interests in X as of greater weight than A’s own interests 
implicated by X. 
 An example may evoke the intuition expressed in this account of 
ordinary private promise. If A promises to pick B up from the airport, 
A will pick B up from the airport if it makes sense. Notwithstanding 
the drama sometimes invoked by the language of promise, A’s prom-
ise does not require A to pick B up from the airport even if A falls 
deathly ill and can easily arrange for someone else to pick up B. The 
promise does require A to pick up B if it becomes more inconvenient 
for A but still not as inconvenient as it would be for B to get home 
without A’s help. One might argue that there are cases where it no 
longer makes sense, all things considered, for A to pick up B—e.g., A 
learns that B prefers some other transport which had not been avail-
able but has become available since the time of the promise—but that 
A is still morally obligated to pick B up until B excuses A. This char-
acterization of A’s obligations is misleading, however. While A might 
be obligated to ask B to be excused, this request does no work except 
to ensure that A is right about her assessment of B’s interests and to 
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put B on notice of the new arrangement. This is demonstrated by the 
fact that, should A be absolutely confident that B prefers the new ar-
rangement, it would not be a breach of A’s promise for her to leave a 
message for B simply informing B of the new plan. B’s actual consent 
is not important where there is no uncertainty about B’s understand-
ing of her interests. 
 If the intuitions expressed in the example are consistent with the 
reader’s, it should be clear that A owes B more and less than what A 
would owe a complete stranger C whom she has agreed to pick up 
from the airport for $50. If A does not pick up C as promised, whether 
A will have to compensate C for nonperformance will usually turn not 
just on the change of circumstances, but on how the parties would 
have been expected to allocate rights and responsibilities had the 
new circumstances been contemplated at the time of contract. Thus, 
if A claims she will not do the pickup for $50 because it is raining, 
one might look to the market to see whether $50 airport rides are 
normally subject to weather conditions and whether it would make 
sense to understand them that way (it might depend on how often it 
rains and what effect rain has on the cost of the trip). No such con-
siderations would be relevant to deciding whether A must fulfill her 
promise to B in the event of rain; instead, whether A should pick up 
B probably depends on whether B has other transport options that 
make more sense on a rainy day. For example, A might be excused 
because under the new circumstances B should take the train, which 
may still take longer than driving in rain traffic in one direction, but 
less time than A driving back and forth in the rain. Similarly, A’s 
promise to C to perform for $50 may be excused where C failed to in-
form her that C had so much luggage that it would have to be 
strapped to the roof of A’s car, if it would have been reasonable to 
charge more for that, even if it the total cost of performance was still 
below $50 for A. A would have to live with B’s excess luggage, howev-
er, unless there was some alternative that was better for them both. 
On the other hand, if A made her promise to B not knowing about B’s 
luggage, and A has bicycles on top of her car that are risky to dis-
mount, B will have to accept squishing her luggage into A’s dirty car 
trunk if at all possible.  
 Although A’s obligations are not uniformly more rigorous to either 
B or C, in some respects, A’s obligations to B are greater than to C, 
and these aspects of promise may explain why we might normally 
take private promises “more seriously” than merely legal ones. If 
something entirely unforeseeable befell C, such that A’s performance 
became critical, A would not be any more or less obligated to perform. 
By contrast, if the same thing happened to B, A would be obligated to 
pick B up even if circumstances have changed for A in a way that she 
would have expected to excuse her. For example, if C unexpectedly 
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breaks his legs (on an undisclosed helicopter skiing trip) and the al-
ternative to A’s pickup (where A happens to have a wheelchair lift) is 
a costly special vehicle that can accommodate wheelchairs, A would 
not be responsible for the unexpectedly high loss resulting from non-
performance of her promise because C’s need to use A’s wheelchair 
lift was not foreseeable at the time she made the promise, even if she 
was fully aware of C’s plight at the time she informed him that she 
would not be picking him up. By contrast, A’s obligation to B would 
rise should misfortune befall B that made A’s performance more im-
portant to B. A would be required to pick B up even if A was unex-
pectedly unable to reschedule the dentist appointment which con-
flicted with B’s arrival time. 
 Finally, if A chooses not to perform because she is offered $500 to 
do something else, she would only be expected to pay C the actual 
loss that C suffers as a result of A’s nonperformance. By contrast, A 
might be expected to share some of the windfall with B, perhaps by 
taking B to dinner (the precise distribution would depend on the 
closeness of the relationship). Similarly, if A fails to perform because 
she has a car accident, she has no further obligation to B. She is not 
required to pay B for his taxi; B effectively shares in her misfortune. 
But if A makes a promise to a stranger and the accident is of a non-
exotic, reoccurring sort, she may be required to compensate C for any 
losses that result from her nonperformance.22 
 Markovits suggests that something even more rigorous than the 
interest aggregation I have described takes place whenever a promise 
is made, whether to an intimate or a stranger. He claims that “[a]s a 
formal matter, at least, contractual promisors, just as promisors sim-
pliciter, intend to give their promisees authority over their ends—to 
pursue, within the sphere of the contract, only ends that their promi-
sees also affirm.”23 But this does not accurately characterize contrac-
tual relations. In a relationship, one may adopt another’s ends, and 
then those ends may adjust as that other person and her objectives 
evolve. However, in an arm’s length transaction, one does not adopt 
the other’s ends; rather, one commits only to particular means (i.e., to 
supply particular means) to the other party’s separately held end. A 
contracting party’s obligations are determined in part, as an inter-
pretative matter, by a reasonable understanding of her partner’s 
purpose in entering into the contract. But it is not the partner’s ends 
per se that are important. Only her ends as they were both contem-
                                                 
 22. My characterization of what promises require between strangers is obviously in-
formed by contract law. But while Shiffrin, because she takes contractual promises to be 
subject to private promissory norms, perceives the divergence between contract and prom-
ise as problematic and in need of correction, I take this divergence as evidence that con-
tract and private promise are different animals. See Shiffrin, supra note 3. 
 23. Markovits, supra note 2, at 1448. 
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plated and expressed at the moment of contract are important, and 
even then, they play only an evidentiary role. 
 Why does the existence of a personal relationship between promi-
sor and promisee make a difference? After all, to give equal weight to 
another’s interests is to maximize joint interests, and economic theo-
ries of law are about interest maximization too. There are two im-
portant differences. First, interest maximization in the context of 
economic theory adopts primarily an ex ante perspective. That is, an 
economist would not simply maximize the joint interests of the par-
ties to a particular contract. The economist would maximize the in-
terests of all present and future parties to similar contracts, and that 
may entail a welfare-diminishing distribution in a particular case. 
This helps explain most of the differences between private and com-
mercial promise identified above. It is because the norms that apply 
between strangers turn on establishing the right incentives at the 
time of promise, not just at the time of performance, and on minimiz-
ing the cost of resolving their disputes that the scope of parties’ obli-
gations depends on what was communicated or known and what pre-
vailed in the market at the time of promise. The ex ante perspective 
is appropriate to strangers.24 Because intimates know more about 
each other, they can more reliably assess and act on a richer account 
of each other’s evolving interests; to the extent this holds true, they 
can adopt and continually update an ex post view. 
 The last point relates to a second. Interest combination between 
intimates is often accompanied by some measure of joint consump-
tion or voluntary internal redistribution. There is no such presump-
tion in a contracts case. It would be unfair for the court to adopt an 
aggregation approach with respect to two individual parties where 
that approach results in clear distributive consequences and there is 
no reason to believe the imbalance will be corrected. This is because 
the contract does not create a community within which there are spe-
cific grounds or mechanisms for subsequent redistribution between 
the parties. To maximize the combined interests of two contracting 
parties is no less arbitrary than reallocating resources between five 
                                                 
 24. It is not surprising that the ex ante view should be more appropriate to contract 
and the ex post view more appropriate to parties situated within a promissory relationship. 
The ex ante view will generally be appropriate to understanding the terms of relationships 
between strangers. It is not a coincidence that not just economists but Rawlsians commit-
ted to the moral vantage afforded by a veil of ignorance seek to understand the rights and 
responsibilities of persons toward each other without taking into account which of a range 
of traits and values particular individuals bear. Outside of the arts, personal familiarity is 
generally necessary before one is either capable of or motivated to take proper account of 
all those facts and feelings that determine a person’s true interests. Those moments in 
which we understand and can respond to a stranger as a complete person are rare and 
ennobling. But while they may illuminate our understanding of ourselves and our relation 
to others, they would be distorting as an account of everyday experience on which we could 
base legal rules. 
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randomly selected persons in order to employ those resources most 
efficiently. By contrast, contract rules set from an ex ante perspective 
maximize the welfare of a nonarbitrarily defined political community, 
within which distribution also takes place. In private promise, the 
unity of interest created by promise against the background of al-
ready partially unified interests makes the distribution of gains and 
losses less important. The aim of private promise is unity, and distri-
bution takes place only between separates. 
 One might argue that true intimates already treat each other’s 
interests as of equal if not greater weight than their own, such that 
promising cannot have the claimed effect. But first, not all intimates 
are so situated that they are obligated to treat each other’s interests 
as equal or more weighty, though sometimes the nature of a relation-
ship (e.g., parent and child) may entail such an obligation even in the 
absence of promise. Where interest aggregation is expected and ob-
ligatory for other reasons, promises are superfluous and rarely made. 
Where combining interests is expected but not morally compulsory 
(prior to promise), a promise moves the relationship along incremen-
tally to that still more intimate state where combining interests is 
both expected and obligatory. A single promise will not catapult a 
relationship to one where all choices are made always with aggregate 
interests in mind. But the more promises have been made, the more 
interest aggregation becomes the parties’ modus operandi, and the 
closer the parties become. Where combining interests is not only not 
obligatory but entirely unexpected, as between strangers, promising 
does not take this form.  
 While the notion of combining interests is not loaded with affect, it 
is only practical or appealing among intimates. We often take into 
account others’ interests, and kind and generous persons give the in-
terests of others more weight than unkind and selfish persons. But to 
treat someone else’s interests as just as important as one’s own in 
one’s private decisionmaking is a rare thing. The effect of a promise 
between intimates is to unify the interests of promisor and promisee 
with respect to the content of the promise. Going forward, a private 
promisor keeps a promise because it is the unified interest of promi-
sor and promisee. The promisor may no longer act on her interests 
alone. This is rare. 
 The effect of intimacy on the character of a promise feeds back in-
to the nature of the relationship. As others have observed, behaving 
trustworthily and in a trusting manner promotes trust. Combining 
interests in one sphere has the effect of unifying interests in other 
spheres. Indeed, this is often the reason for making promises in the 
first place. 
 But this effect is only achieved inasmuch as the promisee can see 
that the promisor acts from unified interests. This is so because, in 
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most cases, the promise is supposed to enact a change in the calcula-
tion of interests (recall that promises are usually made between those 
who are close and seek to become closer).25 That change must be man-
ifest somehow. While it may be possible for a person to harbor an in-
terest in literature without ever acting on that interest by reading, it 
is less plausible to say that one has acquired an interest in literature 
where there has been no behavioral change. 
 Layering contractual obligation over the commitment contained in 
a private promise makes it difficult for the promisor to treat her 
promisee’s interest as of equal or greater weight than her own and 
makes it more difficult for the promisee to act on the belief that the 
promisor will give the promisee’s interests appropriate weight. Per-
formance of a private promise is not usually in the promisor’s inter-
est except inasmuch as she chooses to act on the promisee’s inter-
ests,26 either because of the commitment to do so contained in her 
promise or because she is moved by those interests again at the time 
of performance.27 But a contractual promise creates a selfish reason 
for performance. It creates a reason that not only speaks to the prom-
isor’s own interests but also turns on the divergence of interest be-
tween promisor and promisee. Similarly, the promisee who would 
otherwise rely on the unity of her promisor’s interests with her own 
will now rely instead on the legal priority of her interests over the 
promisor’s. Even if the promisee intends to excuse the promisor from 
performance in circumstances where performance would be morally 
but not legally excused, to the extent that intent is not manifest in 
the contract’s terms, the promisee will find herself in the position of 
exercising power over the promisor that is incompatible with the uni-
                                                 
 25. In stressing the transformative effect of the promise itself, I depart from P.S. Atiyah, 
who claims that promises may operate as admissions with respect to preexisting obliga-
tions. See P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW 184-202 (1981). Although he first 
characterizes a binding promise as a type of consent (which would imply that the promise 
at least has real normative effect), Atiyah goes on to suggest that the justification for treat-
ing the promise as consensual is often that the promise concedes the existence of preexist-
ing obligations. Id. at 184. I follow Atiyah in recognizing that a promise often acknowledges 
background circumstances; in particular, the state of relationships. But as Raz has ob-
served, reducing promise to an evidentiary function misses the obligation created by prom-
ise. Raz, supra note 9, at 925. I would add that the nature of preexisting obligations, and in 
particular, the degree of unity of interest, affects the content of the additional obligation (to 
treat interests as common) undertaken by promise. 
 26. In bilateral private promises, the promise may be in the promisor’s interest,  but 
the value of the other’s performance is greater, and the burden of one’s own performance is 
less because of the existence of a personal relationship. Thus, the making of the promise is 
usually still contingent on the existence of a close personal relationship. 
 27. The promisee’s interest in performance (at the time of performance) and the fact of 
the promisor’s earlier promise are separable reasons to perform, but unlike reasons relat-
ing to legal liability, these reasons can coexist without tension. That the promisee’s interest 
in performance operates as a reason for the promisor to perform is consistent with the na-
ture of the commitment undertaken in her earlier promise, i.e., to adopt the promisee’s 
interests as her own.  
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ty a promise would otherwise accomplish.28 The contract has a sepa-
rating effect that undermines the unifying effect of promise.  
 My characterization of promise admittedly hinges on a positive 
claim about the nature of the practice. But this picture is intuitive, 
not idiosyncratic; others have made similar observations. Melvin Ei-
senberg has argued that donative promises should not be enforceable 
because “the world of gift is driven by affective considerations like 
love, affection, friendship, gratitude, and comradeship” and “[t]hat 
world would be impoverished if it were to be collapsed into the world 
of contract.”29 He, too, noted the unifying effects of promises between 
intimates, contrasting promises within personal relationships with 
those in a commercial context,30 and observed the problem of demon-
strating the motive behind performance of a donative promise.31 Dori 
Kimel has also made this point regarding the psychology of promis-
ing, emphasizing that promises rely on and communicate trust.  
Promises are typically made or exchanged in the framework of on-
going personal relationships. . . . Through [them], messages can be 
conveyed and assurances can be given that trust and its counter-
part, respect—surely two of the most important building blocks of 
every kind of personal relationship—obtain in the relationship be-
tween promisor and promisee.32 
                                                 
 28. In fact, contract implies at least a tentative willingness on the part of the promi-
see to inflict actual harm on the promisor’s interests. See KIMEL, PROMISE, supra note 5, at 
44 (“To make a threat is to communicate the intention to bring about, under certain condi-
tions (non-compliance), a consequence which is (or is thought to be) something the address-
ee would wish to avoid.”). 
 29. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85 CALIF. L. 
REV. 821, 847 (1997). 
 30. Id. (“Commodification stresses separateness both between ourselves and our 
things and between ourselves and other people. . . . [G]ifts diminish separateness.”). 
 31. Id. at 848 (“Under an enforceability regime, it could never be clear to the promi-
see, or even to the promisor, whether a donative promise that was made in a spirit of love, 
friendship, affection, or the like, was also performed for those reasons, or instead was per-
formed to discharge a legal obligation or avoid a lawsuit.”). 
 32. Kimel, Neutrality, supra note 5, at 490. Kimel, however, does not view the content 
of promissory obligations as turning on the nature of the relationship within which a prom-
ise was made. Cf. Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Promises, Trust, and Contract Law, 47 AM. J. 
JURIS. 25, 28 (2002) (“[T]he intrinsic value of a promise, whether unenforceable or enforce-
able, does not lie in its capacity to reinforce interpersonal relationships of trust. Even in 
relationships of ‘perfect’ trust, there would be a need for promises, and a law of contract 
that supports the trustworthiness of the practice does not perforce degrade the trustwor-
thiness of the persons who employ it.”). While promises may not be merely a corrective for 
trust, promises do unify otherwise separate interests and would be superfluous where in-
terests are already unified. 
 The argument here is also consistent with Meir Dan-Cohen’s argument that norma-
tivity and authority are disjunctive. See Meir Dan-Cohen, In Defense of Defiance, 23 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF 24 (1994). Although ultimately concerned to “display the different ways in 
which backing imperatives with sanctions detracts from the normative force that an au-
thority’s utterances might otherwise have,” id. at 26, Dan-Cohen argues for the disjunctivi-
ty of normativity and coercion more generally through his discussion of requests. He main-
tains that a person’s willingness to compel another’s behavior, “a willingness he manifests 
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 Notably, it is the character of the relationship within which pri-
vate promises are normally made, and not their commonly unilateral 
character, which fundamentally distinguishes them from contract.33 
The unilateral character of many private promises reflects the fact 
that the promisor undertakes to act from unified motives and there-
fore need not link the promisee’s interest to a separate interest on 
the part of the promisor. While private promises may take the form 
of mutual promise, what constitutes reciprocity between the interests 
of separate persons amounts to internal symmetry within unified in-
terests. Importantly, unity of interest with respect to the content of a 
given promise does not precede the promise but is the product of it. 
That is, while a relationship within which some unity of interest ex-
ists forms the backdrop against which a private promise is normally 
made, the promise itself extends that unity by establishing unity of 
interest with respect to the content of the promise. A private promise 
thus feeds on a background relationship that may have been previ-
ously buttressed through promise, but it does not depend on the ex-
change form. 
 Although private promise may be either unilateral or bilateral, 
contract is necessarily bilateral. A particular contractual promise 
may not be explicitly linked to a reciprocal promise (and therefore 
may not qualify as bilateral in contract terms), but a promise moti-
vated by self-interest always contemplates some return. Sometimes 
the return is reliance that is useful to the promisor; sometimes the 
return is improved performance of outstanding promises; sometimes 
the return is credibility that will allow the promisor flexibility in fu-
ture economic dealings with the promisee or others. But as there is 
no unity of interest with respect to the content of a contractual prom-
ise, the promisor must have a reason to make the promise that is 
separate from the promisee’s interest in obtaining it. 
 While I believe that the most appropriate way to understand the 
divergence of contract and private promise lies in the unity of inter-
ests created by private promise, which is absent and indeed inappro-
                                                                                                                  
by the use of a coercive threat, evaporates the normative force his request originally had.” 
Id. at 29. “Since coercive threats are avowedly designed to compel compliance, they deprive 
obedience of its expressive, or communicative, potential.” Id. at 38. By treating a request as 
a content-independent reason for performing the request, a person demonstrates to the 
maker of the request the esteem in which she holds him. Id. at 41. 
 33. See Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 833, 844 (“[I]n modern contract law the basic 
fault line in consideration runs at the boundary between commercial promises and dona-
tive promises” and, in the case of donative promises, “the reciprocal transfer would be more 
likely to poison the relationship between A and B than to promote it.”); Anne de Moor, Are 
Contracts Promises?, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 103, 113 (John Eekelaar & 
John Bell eds., Ser. No. 3, 1987) (arguing that the promising in contracts is essentially 
bilateral and therefore conditional, in that each promise is conditioned on the other, and 
“[t]here are reasons for doubting whether conditional promising can give rise to the re-
quired special relationship”). 
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priate outside of personal relationships, one need not buy this specific 
conception of private promise in order to appreciate the more general 
point that private promise is unlike contract in (1) the nature of the 
obligation undertaken and (2) its effect on the relationship within 
which it takes place, and that, as a result, (3) voluntary performance 
is essential to private but not legal promise. That divergence is ne-
glected in contract theory. But there is no reason to expect that the 
same rules should govern all communicated commitments.34  
 Just as private promise is the stuff of personal relationships, con-
tract structures ordinary commercial exchange. Commercial ex-
change takes place between separately self-interested parties who do 
not undertake to promote the other’s good but only to perform on 
terms that serve their own interests. If some parts of the law are de-
signed for a nation of devils, contract law is best suited to a nation of 
strangers. It ensures that parties behave respectfully, i.e., in accord-
ance with just rules that serve the public interest. Like an overly 
stringent cleaner, when those rules are applied to parties who are not 
strangers (or rather, to the degree contracting parties are not 
strangers), they may leave unpleasant marks on the parties’ relation-
ship. Just as law designed for devils may have perverse results when 
applied to angels, so too will law designed for strangers produce un-
fortunate effects on intimates. 
B.   The Character of Contract 
 None of this is to deny the moral character of contractual relations 
and contract performance. Although it is a mistake to regard all 
promises as having an identical normative structure, it is useful to 
speak of contract as a kind of promise (distinct from the substantial 
subset of promise that is private promise) because it highlights certain 
moral properties that contract has in common with other kinds of 
promise. In particular, all promissory practices recognize an individual’s 
power to obligate her future self and to create a corresponding enti-
tlement in another. This tremendous moral capacity helps us create 
continuous and interlinked moral identities, and it is worth preserving.  
 But the moral value of contract as a promissory practice does not 
exhaust the moral significance of contractual obligation. Just as the 
                                                 
 34. This intuition has been expressed elsewhere. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Contract 
Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489, 506 (1989) 
(“[A]ny serious sociological inquiry would very likely identify several different forms of 
promising, each with different background rules and assumptions, even within a single 
community. At the very least, it would certainly be possible for a society to recognize sever-
al different kinds of promises, each with a different set of rules defining the exact scope of 
the obligation.”); Barbara Fried, supra note 19, at 1381 (“People’s sense that promises are a 
uniquely privileged source of obligation seems to me highly dependent on the context—
personal versus commercial—and content of the promise, as well as on the consequences of 
not keeping it.”). 
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fact that private promise takes place between intimates adds to the 
normative structure of private promise, the fact that contract normal-
ly takes place between strangers (or those who are more strangers 
than intimates) is also important to a full picture of the normative 
character of contract. 
 Even involuntary relations between strangers, as in politics, are 
regulated by moral principles. Contract has something important in 
common with other kinds of promise, but the respect that is manifest 
in playing by the rules of contract is also related to the sense of civic 
duty manifest in paying one’s taxes in full and on time. In other 
words, contract, at least in some respects, is like any number of ex-
tralegal agreements or arrangements in which one participates with-
out ever making a promise.35   
 Most political theorists have focused on those obligations between 
individuals and groups in a political community fulfilled through 
broad social policies. Others have attempted to derive from the prin-
ciples of a liberal democratic society those principles which govern 
individual citizens’ relations with one another. Tort theory, in particu-
lar, is marked by disagreement between those who see tort as essen-
tially an instance of larger social policies (whether welfare-enhancing 
or distributive) and others who believe tort embodies prepolitical duties 
owed by individuals to each other. There are intermediate positions, 
which recognize that the state may pursue macro ends but is constrained 
in its “use” of litigants by principles of fairness and responsibility.  
 A similar but less developed debate exists within contract theory. 
The choice again seems to be between, on the one hand, treating con-
tract as an instance of economic regulation, or on the other hand, see-
ing the rules of contract as reflective of prepolitical principles of 
promise and the like. While it is not my purpose here to advance a 
metatheory of contract, I do show here that the prepolitical principles 
of fairness and responsibility which constrain the pursuit of social 
and political ends in contract do not include the promissory norms 
that govern ordinary private promise.  
 Nevertheless, the very fact that contract is part of a system of so-
cial cooperation and may be designed to advance collective ends, such 
as economic welfare and distributive justice, imbues the rules of con-
tract with some of the moral significance characteristic of the regula-
tory institutions of which it is a part. Most of our political-moral obli-
gations are satisfied through interaction with the government. In 
tort, our politically derived obligations are usually satisfied passively. 
In contract, by contrast, we comply with the law actively in our deal-
                                                 
 35. The solemn character of private promises—by which I mean the self-conscious 
undertaking of a moral commitment to do something for a particular person—may have 
more in common with other moral commitments one undertakes than with contract. 
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ings with other individuals. Contract is thus uniquely posed as an 
arena in which civic respect is at once at work and on display. 
 Markovits has argued that contract, as an instance of promise, 
entails a respectful community between the parties that is not based 
on affection.36 He emphasizes the moral value of contract-making (as 
opposed to mere contract-keeping) and suggests that it is a means by 
which we overcome the isolation of our wills and engage in collabora-
tive projects with others.37 Markovits argues that we cease to remain 
strangers upon entering a contract.   
 But this exaggerates either the effect of contract on contracting 
parties or the degree of estrangement implied in one’s precontractual 
status as a stranger. It might be that Markovits believes parties be-
come closer then they do upon entering a contract. But as I have ar-
gued, they do not adopt each other’s ends or projects (as he effectively 
acknowledges in conceding contract does not entail shared coopera-
tive activity).38 Markovits suggests that contractual parties concern 
themselves with each other’s points of view in a way that strangers 
would not.39 Contracting parties do take into account each other’s in-
tentions inasmuch as the apparent intentions of the parties deter-
mine the terms of the contract, thus inducing each party to attend to 
the other’s intentions at least insofar as it determines her own rights 
and obligations under the contract. Moreover, the parties defer to the 
other’s point of view in some respects at the time of contract; after 
all, the value the promisee places on performance is the only relevant 
value of that performance when it comes to damages. But if taking 
into account others’ points of view is all that it takes to become more 
than strangers, then most contracting parties were not strangers to 
begin with. 
 Markovits himself invokes the analogy between commercial and 
social contract.40 In the latter, parties must take into account fellow 
citizens’ points of view if their political conduct is to adequately sup-
port a liberal democratic order. It is the separateness of the point of 
view, and the need to take it into account as that point of view of the 
other, that marks the relation as that of strangers. In the liberal 
model, we engage our sense of justice as we decide those principles 
which will govern the basic structure of society. But within the 
boundaries created by those principles, one is free to pursue one’s 
conception of the good without deferring so radically to the interests 
of others (though some conceptions of the good may dictate other-
                                                 
 36. See Markovits, supra note 2, at 1432, 1451.  
 37. Id. at 1449.  
 38.  Id. at 1457. 
 39. Id. at 1451. 
 40.  Daniel Markovits, Arbitration’s Arbitrage: Social Solidarity at the Nexus of Adju-
dication and Contract, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 431, 466 (2010). 
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wise). Likewise, parties to a contract must take into account the oth-
er’s intentions in understanding the boundaries of their sphere of 
choice, but in selecting their course of action within those boundaries, 
parties are unencumbered by the other party’s general interests. 
Contracting parties are not radically isolated from each other prior to 
contract, but nor does contract bring them together so as to fundamen-
tally alter their relations. While repeated contract might be an occasion 
for parties to develop a personal relationship within which private 
promise might take place, the bare fact of exchange—even repeated 
exchange—does not imply any such evolution in the relationship. 
 The communal nature of contract refers properly not to the com-
munity created between promisor and promisee but to the larger eco-
nomic and political community in which the transaction takes place. 
In everyday commercial experiences, one is struck not by the rela-
tionship one develops (or fails to develop) with the other party, but by 
the feeling of having entered an existing community in which this 
transaction regularly takes place. The fact that the contract takes 
place as one among numerous similar contracts that each party has, 
could, or will enter into with others dictates the terms of the particu-
lar agreement at hand, most notably by determining the parties’ ex-
pectations and price. My confidence in my contractual partner’s per-
formance is shaped by others’ past experiences with that same part-
ner, the fact that others will seek (or be responsive to) information 
from me about that partner before they enter into relations with him 
in the future, and in part by the legal context. Generality and com-
monality are characteristic of the marketplace. By contrast, particu-
larity and contextuality are characteristic of promise. Therein lies 
the felt difference between reading a product review on a consumer 
website and reading an inevitably odd account in a magazine of how 
one should handle one’s spouse.   
 The impersonal nature of contract is an opportunity to show re-
spect to others qua person, for one does not know or is, in any event, 
usually not interested in much else about the other party (besides 
those aspects relevant to that person’s ability to perform). Thus when 
one plays by the rules in contract, one not only acknowledges the con-
tinuity of moral identity, but in deferring to those common rules with 
respect to the substance of one’s obligation and its consequences, one 
demonstrates respect for all those for whom the rules were designed. 
Playing by the rules is a form of respect that has nothing to do with 
the particular other person with whom one happens to be dealing. 
This is especially evident when one thinks about what it means not 
to play by the rules with the average contracting party. A consumer 
that returns an item she has herself broken does not just harm the 
company but also all the other consumers who now will have to pay 
more for goods with a comparable return policy or, in many cases, to 
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the many shareholders whose interest in the company is marginally 
diminished. We need not reduce the moral obligation to a consequen-
tialist one to see that the consequences of a wrong are relevant to 
identifying whom one has in fact wronged. Arrangements in which I 
am not directly involved (e.g., price collusion) may make a given con-
tract of mine more wrongful to me than another in which the other 
party has intentionally withheld some undetectable aspect of his per-
formance. Contract wrongs are appropriately understood as both 
promissory wrongs and as part of the range of wrongs that amount to 
failure to play by the rules of fair commercial exchange.41 
 Dori Kimel has suggested that the impersonal nature of contract 
is also a value in itself. Contract provides a framework for  
doing certain things with others not only outside of the contexts of 
already-existing personal relationships, but also without a com-
mitment to the future prospect of such relationships, without being 
required to know much or form opinions about the personal attrib-
utes of others, and without having to allow others to know much 
and form opinions about oneself.42  
Kimel calls the value of this opportunity the value of personal de-
tachment.43 Kimel suggests that at least part of the value of personal 
detachment is that it keeps commercial relationships from over-
whelming truly intimate ones. “[T]he more dependent people are on 
personal relations for the pursuit of goals which are, themselves, ex-
ternal to such relations, and the less selective they are allowed to be 
in creating, developing, and maintaining their personal relations, the 
less valuable the relations they have are likely to be.”44 In his insight 
that personal detachment is valuable in part because it is necessary 
to throw intimacy into relief, Kimel points toward the value of rela-
tional diversity: the value in having different levels of trust and shar-
ing with different people in different parts of our lives. 
 It is easy to romanticize personal relationships and systematically 
favor them over other types of relationships. One often perceives in 
cultural commentary nostalgia for a time when one’s interactions 
with everyone were ostensibly personal and intimate. Restaurants, 
for example, are celebrated where the waiter appears sincerely inter-
ested in one’s culinary experience. I would suggest that this is mis-
guided. Like intimacy, private promises are valuable because they 
are rare and not appropriate in most interpersonal contexts. Were 
our daily lives swamped with such promises, promising would be 
drained of partiality. And promising without partiality is not much 
                                                 
 41. It is not necessary to reduce contract to these general wrongs. See generally 
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 2d ed. 1995). 
 42. Kimel, Neutrality, supra note 5, at 491-92. 
 43. Id. at 492. 
 44. Id. 
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more appealing than friendship without partiality. There is a pleas-
ure in promising a friend that one will help her in a time of need. But 
there is also a pleasure in anonymously purchasing a carton of milk 
without having to engage the full range of one’s moral capacities. 
These pleasures are associated with distinct moral values, and to 
preserve both, the law must respect the distinction between contract 
and private promise. 
C.   Objections to the Divergence of Contract and Private Promise 
 Before exploring implications of my approach for the scope of con-
tract law, I will consider some objections to the basic approach to 
promise I have suggested here. I will start out by considering two 
methodological objections, though they relate to certain substantive 
objections I will consider separately. 
 The two methodological objections can be stated as questions: 
First, what makes my characterization of promise promissory? Se-
cond, in what sense is what I characterize as a private promise more 
private than other types of promise? 
 My account of promise is promissory to the very extent it accords 
with and explains what we commonly regard as the practice of prom-
ising. There is undoubtedly no consensus on what promise entails. 
Inasmuch as my account ventures to detail rather specifically the 
nature of the obligation undertaken in promise, it is more likely to 
strike some as false. I have not attempted to explain why promising 
should entail treating promisee’s interests with respect to the content 
of the promise as of equal or greater weight, because I do not believe 
that promising has to take that form, and indeed, I believe it takes 
that form only within personal relationships. Nevertheless, promis-
ing does take that form in personal relationships, and this is the con-
text in which most promises are made. I believe characterizing prom-
ise in this way captures what many promisors and promisees intend 
and experience when they participate in the practice of promising. I 
am not concerned here with the language with which one makes a 
promise, but what I describe as promise is not limited to those com-
mitments expressly labeled by the promisor as promise. 
 One might argue that what I characterize as private promise is 
but a modified form of promise. On this view, promise has a universal 
(probably quite rigorous) form, and the commitments made within 
personal relationships are diluted by foreign, nonpromissory norms, 
such as the norms endogenous between lovers or friends.45 The uni-
versal form of promise is a Platonic ideal, as compared to which any 
instance of promise is but a pale shadow. 
                                                 
 45. I thank Dori Kimel for articulating this position. 
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 I do not think such an approach is conceptually flawed, but it is 
simply less useful than the more flexible approach pursued here. 
Recognizing private promise as distinct from other sorts of promises 
does not deny that there is moral continuity with other forms of 
promise. It may be useful to preserve a larger category of promise in 
order to recognize the moral significance of the general practice of 
binding oneself to others. But that broad practice is diverse, and it 
obfuscates more than it illuminates the practice to insist that it is 
subject to common norms, which are substantially modified and per-
haps compete with others before directing promisors’ conduct in a 
given case. Of course, if private promise were just an unusual case of 
promise, such that most promises were not so modified, this alterna-
tive approach would make sense; the universal form of promise would 
be no Platonic ideal—it would be an empirically confirmable fact. But 
I think private promise is too close to what is commonly regarded as 
the paradigmatic promise to be explained as an exceptional category 
of modified promise. 
 Moreover, the features of promise which vary across contexts are 
too important to be regarded as mere modifications of a uniform 
practice of promise. The overarching moral feature of promise that is 
common to all types is the exercise of autonomy to create simultane-
ously an obligation for oneself and a right in another person. That 
defining feature of a promise may generate “identification” norms 
that are common to many types of promise; that is, this central moral 
structure of promise may determine which commitments we properly 
regard as promissory. But regulatory norms of promise are as im-
portant as these identification norms. Regulatory norms determine 
when a promise must be kept (including what counts as keeping a 
promise) and what happens (morally speaking) when a promise is 
breached. The regulatory aspects of promise, which speak to the con-
tent of the commitment undertaken, are as central to promise as 
identification norms, and I have argued that these regulatory norms 
vary considerably depending on the context in which a commitment 
is made. Were regulatory norms excluded from the larger category of 
promissory norms in order to preserve a uniform notion of promise, 
the concept of promise would be too light; it would fail to explain es-
sential aspects of the practice. For this reason, I think it makes sense 
to speak of different kinds of promise, rather than pure promise, on 
the one hand, and distortions of promise, on the other. 
 The second methodological objection raises the question of precise-
ly to which promisors and promisees I am referring. I believe that 
private promising takes place between friends, relatives, and lovers. 
Just as there is no universal form of promising, there is no single 
form of promising between lovers or among friends and family, but I 
think that those in such relationships internalize the interests of the 
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others to some degree. A promise does not entail radically internaliz-
ing all of the other’s interests; indeed, small promises at the early 
stage of friendship may reflect only limited unity of interests. By con-
trasting private promise with contract, I do not mean to suggest that 
there are two categories into which all promises can be easily sepa-
rated or that all promises that I would label private promises are 
alike. Some promises are more private than others, in that some take 
place within closer relationships than others. Promises made in rela-
tionships where many interests are already pooled likely will be tak-
en by the parties to have greater unifying effect than a promise made 
between acquaintances who are only beginning to take each other’s 
ends as among their own.  
 This leads to an array of substantive objections to my characteri-
zation of promise and its workings. For example, one might claim 
that a promise need not create a sufficient reason for acting on its 
content; perhaps a promise need only be a but-for condition of per-
formance. That is, one might claim that so long as the actor would 
not have acted but for the presence of a promise, the initial commit-
ment qualifies as a promise. In that case, it would be irrelevant pre-
cisely why the promise triggers compliance. It might be because of 
the unity of interest it creates, or it might be because it sets into mo-
tion a series of events—business events that amount to reliance, or 
legal “events” that result in contractual status. 
 But such an approach is not consistent with our practice and 
common understanding of promise. Many of the things we promise 
we fully expect to want to do independently at the time of perfor-
mance. The promissory character of the commitment does not depend 
on a change of circumstances that makes performance undesirable 
from the point of view of the promisor. The promise just makes it the 
case that we have a reason to do what we have promised should the 
independent reasons cease to operate. Thus, it cannot be a defining 
characteristic of promises that they are necessary but not sufficient 
reasons for their subsequent performance. 
 Perhaps a more likely objection would question my emphasis on 
the objective character of promise and reliance as essential to private 
promising. One might argue that enforceability does not convolute a 
promisor’s motives, because legal enforcement is usually improbable. 
 First, although legal enforcement by a promisee is usually unlike-
ly due to high transaction costs, the costs of defending a suit are also 
high, and thus the risks of breach are even greater than what the law 
strictly speaking recognizes as the compensable loss. This makes it 
likely that the possibility of legal enforcement is still a net reason in 
favor of performance. Second, it is not just the actual threat of a court 
order that affects the voluntariness of compliance. Most people will 
not do something that will subject them to legal action even if legal 
2011]  SEPARATING CONTRACT AND PROMISE 733 
 
action is unlikely. That is because the law is taken to condemn the 
conduct in question. Even if breach is not intended to be marked ille-
gal by the availability of damages, the availability of damages upon 
breach makes breaching conduct at least subject to social disapproval. 
Even those savvy observers who might realize that the law does not 
ultimately discourage breach will take the availability of damages as 
disapproving the failure to make the nonbreaching party whole. Thus 
we can expect the law to create reasons for performance (or at least 
compensation) that would not otherwise exist. 
 One could also argue that enforceability does not cloud a promi-
sor’s motives because in order for enforceability to degrade the char-
acter of promise, the parties must be aware that their promises are 
enforceable, and this is not always the case.46 Where it is really the 
case that promisor and promisee believe that a promise is not en-
forceable, this objection is valid. But without evidence to support the 
claim, I venture that popular tendencies are to overestimate the 
scope of the law. Contract law is so pervasive that parties are in-
clined to think they have legal redress for all but the most minor 
promises. The latter simply do not comprise the territory for which 
the divergence of contract and promise is relevant. 
  One might also object to the objectivity requirement by arguing 
that while a promise, to be effective, must be sufficient reason to per-
form, or sufficient reason to rely on the prospect of performance, its 
sufficiency need not be apparent to an objective observer. For exam-
ple, one might argue that the sufficiency of the reason, i.e., that in-
terests are unified, is important because of the close relationship it 
both demonstrates and reinforces, and that what may not strictly 
speaking be objective can nevertheless be known to parties within 
the relationship. For example, though your ability to profit from 
breach may be externally limited, I might nevertheless “know” that 
you would keep your promise even if there was no consequence of 
nonperformance to you. My knowledge may be secured by personal 
facts and unaffected by the fact that, by virtue of the contractual sta-
tus of my promise, my knowledge pertains only to a hypothetical and 
cannot be confirmed. 
 At first blush, this characterization of promise might appear to 
vitiate the need for an objectivity requirement because it is con-
sistent with certain deeply personal promises we might make. In par-
ticular, we cannot confirm the sufficiency of a promise as either a 
reason for action or reason for reliance in connection with any back-
ward-looking promise. However, upon further consideration, we will 
see that backward-looking promises are not promises at all, and oth-
er so-called promises that are not confirmable, if they are promises, 
                                                 
 46. See Bellia, Jr., supra note 32, at 38. 
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are of lower value than (or at least, importantly different from) a 
classic promise. 
 A backward-looking promise is one that is contingent on an im-
possible event, namely, an event in the past that has not occurred. A 
promise contingent on an impossible event might be this: I promise 
that if a ghost really does live under your bed, I will catch it and 
throw it out the window. A backward-looking promise might be this: I 
promise that if had known it was going to take you an hour to get 
here by bus, I would have picked you up. Or, I promise that if I 
hadn’t already purchased my plane ticket to Aruba, I would have vis-
ited you at the hospital. These promises are not properly regarded as 
promises at all. An essential characteristic of promises is that they 
involve the assumption of a commitment. Backward-looking promis-
es, like other promises relating to the impossible, resemble promises 
only in that they are intended to communicate present good will. In 
communicating good will, these so-called promises may, like real 
promises, foster and reinforce relationships between promisor and 
promisee. But unlike the making of a real promise, making a back-
ward-looking promise does not actually commit one to anything. 
 This example should help us see why it is important that a promi-
sor be able to disconfirm, or disavow, the normative move ostensibly 
achieved by promise. It must be possible to break a promise. It is im-
possible to break backward-looking promises and that is why they 
are not real promises. If a promise entails adopting as sufficient rea-
son for action the unity of interest created by promise, then breaking 
a promise should entail failing to treat as sufficient reason the fact of 
promise. It is impossible to break a promise in this sense, where the 
performance of the promise is overdetermined. The objectivity re-
quirement does not depend on an inherent skepticism about the pos-
sibility of subjective knowledge of another’s intentions, though such 
skepticism may be warranted. The objectivity requirement stems just 
from the fact that a promise consists not only of an intention, but also 
a commitment undertaken, and it is simply impossible to make and 
break a commitment in the right way where the sufficiency of the 
promise can never be tested. 
 This argument parallels Kant’s argument that there can be no 
justice between individuals who are forced to resolve disputes be-
tween themselves for lack of a third party adjudicator.47 Kant’s re-
                                                 
 47. Kant argues that civil society is morally imperative because only then is an au-
thority available to adjudicate private disputes in accordance with the law; only then may 
conflict be resolved by reason rather than force. See IMMANUEL KANT, Metaphysical First 
Principles of the Doctrine of Right, in THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 33, 121-24 (Mary 
Gregor trans. 1991); see also id. at 85 (discussing the impotence of unilateral will); 
IMMANUEL KANT, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, in KANT: 
POLITICAL WRITINGS 41, 44 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 2d enlarged ed. 1991) (dis-
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fusal to recognize even a fair outcome (here defined as the outcome 
that would have been achieved had the dispute been resolved by a 
neutral third party) as just is more than an epistemological point. 
That is, Kant does not make the claim merely that we do not know 
whether the resolution arrived at by the parties is just. He explains 
that the very fact that the parties must resolve the dispute on their 
own necessarily makes it impossible for the correct, or morally rele-
vant, criteria alone to control the outcome of the dispute. That is be-
cause even an agreement to take into account only the appropriate 
criteria is subject to the whim of each party, or at least that of the 
stronger party. Even if that party is committed to resolving the dis-
pute fairly, the fact that the weaker party must rely on that com-
mitment makes a factor out of the parties’ respective strength. The 
bare existence of a corrupting reason for the weaker party to go along 
with an outcome, e.g., fear of the other party’s use of force, under-
mines the legitimacy of that outcome, irrespective of whether the 
weaker party was subjectively motivated by that reason. 
 Similarly, in the case of promise, the existence of an improper rea-
son to perform undermines the moral upshot of the decision to per-
form, regardless of whether the improper reason in fact motivates the 
decision. In a pre-civil society in which parties must resolve disputes 
between themselves, the absence of law corrupts even a sincere 
commitment by parties to resolve a dispute fairly; in the private 
world of promise which operates within the sphere of contract, the 
presence of law corrupts even a sincere commitment of a promisor to 
give equal weight to a promisee’s interests. The absence of law cor-
rupts the pursuit of justice; the interference of law can corrupt the 
pursuit of private relations. 
 Acknowledging the costs of imposing legal order on certain private 
relations does not inevitably lead to a radically liberal attitude to-
ward law’s domain. The costs of legal order are but one aspect of a 
well-known tension between the liberty-enhancing and liberty-
restraining aspects of law. My aim is to suggest and explain what 
seems intuitive: that contract law too has not just the well-recognized 
potential to facilitate freedom by enabling planning and cooperation, 
but also risks suffocating personal relations that depend on their 
separateness from the civil order. Interference is not limited to pro-
hibition or even regulation at odds with “internal norms.” 
 Another objection to my characterization of promises and their 
necessary independence from contract law might stem from the claim 
that the legalization of a promise is actually akin to premature per-
formance. Opting into a promise may demonstrate precisely the pri-
                                                                                                                  
cussing unsocial sociability); see generally Jeremy Waldron, Kant’s Legal Positivism, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 1535 (1996). 
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vate commitment that the promisor would otherwise have to wait 
until the time of performance to fully display, and for the promisee to 
fully appreciate. And so, the argument would go, a promisor who 
knowingly takes steps to give her promise legal effect is effectively 
beginning performance of her private promise. Zealous performance 
surely cannot undo the promissory status of the initial commitment. 
 This argument is flawed. One relatively uncontroversial feature of 
a promise is delay: delay between the time of promise and the time of 
performance. At the extreme, a promise made simultaneously with 
performance is better characterized as an announcement or descrip-
tion of one’s actions. For example, “I promise to put this down gen-
tly,” said as one places the fragile object carefully down is not really a 
promise so much as an announcement of good intentions. In certain 
situations, because performance takes place over time, a promise 
made at the time of performance may still precede completion of per-
formance. But the promise is either once again a statement of good 
intentions with the implicit acknowledgment that these intentions 
may be thwarted by unintentional failure (such that the accounting 
of one’s action resembles a real, future-directed promise), or the 
promise is in effect that one will in the future carry through on the 
performance one has begun. In the latter case, performance has effec-
tively been severed into that part which is simultaneous with the 
promise and the performance that forms the content of the promise, 
i.e., the remaining performance. Any promise that is properly labeled 
as such promises performance in the future. 
 Delay between the time of promise and the time of performance 
has moral significance from the perspective of both promisor and 
promisee. From the perspective of the promisor, at least two related 
aspects of promising future performance is morally important. First, 
the fact that one is promising performance in the future enables one 
to bind one’s future self. This expands infinitely the kinds of com-
mitments we are capable of making and, in doing so, expands infi-
nitely the kinds of plans we can make. Second, perhaps more basic, 
promising with respect to the future helps create a continuous moral 
person. It is because our relations with others are not recreated at 
each moment but ongoing that the moral person constructed out of 
those rights and obligations is a continuous subject. 
 Delay is also morally significant from the perspective of the prom-
isee. Parallel to the promisor, the fact that the promisee can hold 
claims into the future and establish relationships involving obliga-
tion and entitlement helps construct a continuous moral subject. Se-
cond, the fact that one can create entitlements into the future makes 
reliance reasonable and enables us to plan effectively for a far great-
er range of activities and ambitions than would otherwise be possible. 
Thus, we should regard the delay between promise and performance 
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as essential to the moral practice of promising. We cannot then avoid 
the problem of contractual recognition by merely relabeling legalization 
or the adoption of legal form as the first step of performance. 
 Still another objection might be that my characterization of pri-
vate promise glorifies the existence of a relationship between promi-
sor and promisee that not only need not exist, but the existence of 
which may actually be improbable given the fact of promise. For ex-
ample, one might argue that where true, personal, voluntary, com-
mitment has special worth, the parties would refrain from promise 
and rely instead on the strength and stability of the relationship it-
self. Along these lines, Barbara Fried suggests that promising to do 
what one is already obligated to do (and perhaps to wants to do) is a 
“morally distancing act that introduces doubt about the emotional 
inevitability of performance where none previously existed.”48 
 As discussed earlier, it is indeed likely that complete intimates 
have little left to promise each other. But relationships exist along a 
continuum, and private promises are most likely between those who 
share some but not all interests. Where some but not all interests are 
joined, promising helps to join some subset of the unjoined interests, 
and that marginal increase in the unity of interest propels the par-
ties along the continuum of intimacy. 
 A final objection might be that my approach does not instruct as to 
whose sense of the relationship determines whether a commitment is 
a promise or contract. Is it a matter of the lowest common denomina-
tor, such that intimacy would operate the way intention once did, i.e., 
would it only take the subjective absence of felt intimacy by one party 
to convert a private promise to contract? The problem can be solved 
just as the problem of intention ultimately was: by reference to objec-
tive norms. Just as we now ask whether it was reasonable for each 
party to believe that the other intended agreement, courts may ask 
whether it was reasonable for each party to believe that their rela-
tionship was under the jurisdiction of contract. 
II.   REGULATING PRIVATE PROMISE 
 The practical implications of the above approach for private prom-
ises are twofold: First, contract law should avoid enforcing private 
promises except in the absence of compelling reasons independent of 
                                                 
 48. Barbara Fried, supra note 19, at 1383; see also P.S. Atiyah, Fuller and the Theory 
of Contract, in ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 73, 78 (1986) (observing that to invoke formal contract in 
an intimate, family relationship “often destroys the very trust on which the relationship is 
based”); Raz, supra note 9, at 931 (“It is a mark of a healthy relationship that the number 
of explicit promises is small and that the boundary between explicit promises and other 
voluntary obligations is normally invisible.”). But Raz also observes that “[p]romises be-
tween strangers are the exception, and any attempt to understand the practice of promis-
ing by focusing on these unusual promises is only too likely to breed distortions.” Id. 
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promissory norms. Second, where public policy dictates enforcing pri-
vate promises, courts should minimize the injury to private promis-
ing by limiting damages to reliance. 
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A.   The Scope of Enforceable Promises 
 The first set of implications of my approach may be apparent: 
Contract doctrine should avoid enforcing private promises. Promisso-
ry norms should, as a rule, not be taken as reason to bring contract 
law to bear on private promises.49 In many cases, it is appropriate to 
require that private promisors who wish to make their promises le-
gally enforceable go out of their way, e.g., by complying with a formal 
writing requirement, by obtaining counsel, or through notarization.50  
 While the theoretical justification for this approach offered above 
departs from prevailing views, current doctrine already avoids en-
forcing most private promises. In particular, the doctrine of consider-
ation in principle holds that only promises which are bargained for 
within an exchange are enforceable, and most private promises do 
not meet that requirement. Notably, it is extremely difficult to sub-
stitute moral obligation, such as that which might commonly arise 
within the course of a personal relationship, for consideration. Courts 
generally refuse to force compensation for services for which a fee 
                                                 
 49. This section together with the next shows that a theory of promise and its relation 
to contract can indeed bear fruit by suggesting default rules and interpretive principles. 
Cf. Craswell, supra note 34, at 504 (“It is less clear that the philosophical literature dis-
cussed above has any implications for the content of contract law’s background rules. All of 
the authors discussed above recognize that any real system of promising would have to 
include some set of rules governing excuses, remedies, and other details of the promisor’s 
obligation. Their purpose, however, was to analyze the practice of promising at a higher 
level of abstraction.”). 
 50. In any context in which a formal requirement is imposed, there is the risk that 
promisors’ and promisees’ intentions with respect to the legal effect of their agreement will 
not be respected because of an inadvertent failure to comply with the formal requirement. 
Such requirements will be most appropriate in contexts where we believe most promisors 
and promisees do not intend their agreement to have legal effect, even in the negative 
sense that they have not contemplated the question. The opposite rule, which would re-
quire a promisor to avoid legal promise by way of an explicit opt-out provision, may be 
undesirable because a promisor who wishes to perform voluntarily may inadvertently 
communicate a lack of confidence in her own performance. A rule requiring that a promisor 
undertake legal promise expressly in these contexts may foster better communication. A 
promisee who insists on formal documentation of the promise in order to ensure legal en-
forceability communicates valuable information to the promisor about her attitude toward 
the promise and the relationship within which it takes place. 
 There are certain contexts in which we do not merely tolerate but rather encourage 
prospective promisors and promisees to make legally binding promises alongside their 
private promises. For example, a state may choose to encourage prenuptial agreements. 
Requiring that parties comply with burdensome formalities will reduce the likelihood 
that they will enter such agreements not only because of the costs involved but because 
neither party will wish to initiate formal contractual relations. (Thanks to Gregory Klass 
for this point.) We can require formalities but avoid this result if we require that the par-
ties enter into a legally binding contract. The formal requirements will still be useful in 
separating out the private and legal dimensions of the parties’ agreement; indeed, in some 
cases the legal promises might differ from the private promises made. Requiring parties to 
expend resources in order to enter a formal contract (in order to obtain some state benefit) 
may be justified if, and only if, we value highly parties’ input into their future legal rights 
and responsibilities. 
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could have been bargained but was not, and a reciprocal promise that 
is clearly related to such a past service is not enforceable either.51 
Courts have also inquired whether the promisee who conferred an 
earlier benefit would have expected compensation at the time she 
conferred the benefit, an inquiry that turns on the nature of the rela-
tionship between promisor and promisee.52 Both of those inquiries 
have the effect of removing most private promises beyond the law. 
 It may also be the case that, in their application of doctrine, courts 
are more amenable to enforcing promises made outside of personal 
relationships.53 For example, many of the cases in which moral obli-
gation is rejected as an alternative basis for enforcing a promise are 
ones where the moral obligation arose in the context of a personal 
relationship. By contrast, the most common context in which “moral 
obligation” is given force is where a defendant promised to pay a 
commercial debt which is no longer otherwise collectable due to a 
statute of limitations.54 Promises made to support family members 
are not usually enforced, notwithstanding the famous textbook case 
of Ricketts v. Scothorn.55 Two textbook cases of moral obligation 
                                                 
 51. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) RESTITUTION § 3 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1983) (allow-
ing recovery under quasi-contract only where failure to obtain consent prior to conferral of 
service was excused, as in “circumstances of exigency”). In Mills v. Wyman, a father re-
fused to perform a promise to pay the man who cared for his son before his death. Mills v. 
Wyman, 20 Mass. 207, 209 (1825). The court described the claim as not importantly differ-
ent from one in quasi-contract and left it to the “tribunal of conscience.” Id. at 210; see also 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 134-35 (7th ed. 2007); Saul Levmore, 
Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65, 79-81 (1985). 
 52. Compare In re Gerke’s Estate, 73 N.W.2d 506, 508 (1955) (“Past services rendered 
by a person not a member of the promissor’s family are adequate consideration for a prom-
ise to compensate for them by a legacy.”) with McMurry v. Magnusson, 849 S.W.2d 619, 
622 (1993) (“The existence of a family relationship, once it is established, gives rise to a 
presumption that services rendered were intended to be gratuitous. . . . For purposes of 
raising the presumption that services were rendered gratuitously, a family is defined as ‘a 
collective body of persons under one head and one domestic government, who have recipro-
cal, natural, or moral duties to support and care for each other.’ ”). 
 53. See Peter Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive Concep-
tion of Contract: Hegel and Contemporary Contract Theory, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1077, 1085 
(1989) (“[I]n relations of solidarity such as friendship or family where individuals do not 
normally regard each other [as mutually independent], the law presumes that unless the 
parties show otherwise they do not intend to bind themselves contractually. This is so even 
if their expressions of intention formally fulfill the other desiderata of contract formation.”) 
(citing Balfour v. Balfour, [1919] 2 K.B. 571 (A.C.) (Eng.) (holding that though parties 
agreement met criteria for contractual formation, law would presume that husband and 
wife did not intend to enter contract)). 
 54. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 82 (1981); see also Wilson v. Butt, 
190 S.E. 260, 263 (Va. 1937) (holding that a promise to pay a debt barred by a statute of 
limitations is sustainable by virtue of the moral obligation arising from the debt); Orsborn 
v. Old Nat’l Bank of Wash., 516 P.2d 795, 797 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973) (citing the “well-
settled” rule that “a moral obligation arising from or connected with what was once a legal 
liability, which has since become suspended or barred by operation of a positive rule of law 
or statute, will furnish consideration for a subsequent executory promise”). 
 55. 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898), discussed infra note 71; see also Terry v. Terry, 217 S.W. 
842, 844-45 (Mo. Ct. App. 1919) (refusing to enforce agreement among siblings to pay those 
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demonstrate the point. In Webb v. McGowin, Webb suffered substan-
tial bodily injuries in successfully saving McGowin’s life.56 McGowin 
promised to support Webb for the remainder of the latter’s life, but 
McGowin’s estate ceased payment some time after McGowin’s 
death.57 The court held that McGowin’s promise was enforceable be-
cause it was made in light of a preexisting moral obligation.58  
 The Webb court was careful, however, to construe the doctrine on 
terms that limited its scope. The court, early in its opinion, twice not-
ed that Webb acted “within the scope of his employment” and that it 
was his “duty . . . in the course of his employment” to drop the pine 
block which, were it not diverted, would have seriously injured 
McGowin.59 The court analogized Webb’s act to the administration of 
medicine by a physician to an ill man, in which case subsequent 
promise to pay would also have been valid.60 The court stated its 
holding in terms of property,61 and went on to emphasize the econom-
ic nature of the benefit conferred:  
Any holding that saving a man from death or grievous bodily harm 
is not a material benefit sufficient to uphold a subsequent promise 
to pay for the service, necessarily rests on the assumption that 
saving life and preservation of the body from harm have only a 
sentimental value. The converse of this is true. Life and preserva-
tion of the body have material, pecuniary values, measurable in 
dollars and cents.62 
The court observed that “[t]he case at bar is clearly distinguishable 
from that class of cases where the consideration is a mere moral obli-
gation or conscientious duty unconnected with receipt by promisor of 
benefits of a material or pecuniary nature.”63 The court thus went out 
of its way to suggest that “mere moral obligation” as might arise out 
of a personal relationship is an inadequate substitute for considera-
tion, but that material economic benefits delivered in a context giving 
                                                                                                                  
who had cared for parents); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An 
Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1306 (1980) (“Courts generally 
refuse to enforce intrafamilial promises under section 90, even when the promisee claims 
he has incurred costs from tangible actions in reliance.”); see supra notes 52-53. 
 56. 168 So. 196, 196-97 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935). 
 57.  Id.  
 58.  Id. at 197. 
 59. Id. at 196.  
 60. Id. at 198. 
 61. Id. at 197 (“Where the promisee cares for, improves, and preserves the property of 
the promisor, though done without his request, it is sufficient consideration for the promi-
sor’s subsequent agreement to pay for the service . . . .”). 
 62. Id. at 197-98. 
 63. Id. at 198; see also id. (“[A] moral obligation is a sufficient consideration to support 
an executory promise where the promisor has received an actual pecuniary or material 
benefit for which he subsequently expressly promised to pay.”).  
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rise to a legitimate expectation of compensation may operate as effec-
tive substitutes for consideration.64 
 By contrast, in Harrington v. Taylor, the court refused to enforce a 
promise by a man whose life was saved by a friend of his wife who 
had intervened as the wife was about to decapitate her husband.65 
The wife’s friend’s hand was mutilated as a result of her interven-
tion.66 In this case, the court held that “however much the defendant 
should be impelled by common gratitude to alleviate the plaintiff’s 
misfortune, a humanitarian act of this kind, voluntarily performed, is 
not such consideration as would entitle her to recover at law.”67 One 
might question the court’s characterization of this case and its con-
sistency with Webb. The language of the two cases suggests that the 
outcomes turn on whether the benefit conferred was voluntary. How-
ever, it is unlikely that Webb was obligated to throw himself down 
with the pine block to save McGowan, even if his job required him to 
drop the pine block. The difference seems rather to be the court’s in-
tuition about what motivated Webb and Harrington to save their de-
fendants. Because Webb was acting in the course of employment, it is 
reasonable to believe he was not acting in the context of a personal 
relationship. Because Harrington, on the other hand, was acting in 
the context of domestic violence and became involved as a result of 
her friendship with the wife, the court was more willing to dismiss 
the incident as a private affair. It is also possible that because Har-
rington was a woman, it seemed more plausible to the court that her 
actions were “private” in nature and done with no thought as to her 
own economic well-being. Given that Harrington prevented the com-
mission of a crime, one might question this implicit characterization 
of her conduct. But putting aside its operation in Harrington, we 
might nevertheless endorse the basic distinction between moral obli-
gations that arise between strangers, which can generate contractual 
obligations, and moral obligations that arise in the context of person-
al relationships, which usually do not. 
 Reliance may operate as a substitute for consideration but limita-
tions on that doctrine also suggest its primary application is and 
should be outside of personal relationships.68 Contemporary courts 
may be reluctant to recognize reliance that is not economic, which 
                                                 
 64. Id.  
 65. 36 S.E.2d 227, 227 (N.C. 1945). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See RESTATEMENTS (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981) (“A promise which the 
promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the prom-
isee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injus-
tice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach 
may be limited as justice requires.”). 
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renders many private promises ineligible for estoppel.69 Of course, 
many private promises do result in substantial economic reliance. 
Some of those give rise to liability because failing to acknowledge 
them would result in systematic injustice, as in the context of mar-
riage.70 But the fact that so many private promises are materially 
relied upon actually suggests that such cases do not usually generate 
legal liability, for if they did, the courts would be swamped with cases 
in which people sued to enforce broken promises that resulted in sub-
stantial economic loss. Every day people move long distances, quit 
jobs, buy and sell homes, purchase flights, book hotel rooms, and buy 
expensive clothing in reliance on promises they were made.71 But 
                                                 
 69. See, e.g., Atria v. Vanderbilt Univ., 142 F. App’x 246, 256-57 (6th Cir. 2005) (“To 
support a claim for promissory estoppel, however, a plaintiff must show that his reliance 
caused an economic detriment.”); Calabro v. Calabro, 15 S.W.3d 873, 879 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1999) (“[T]he detriment suffered in reliance must be substantial in an economic sense.”); 
see also Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49 
HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1253 (1998) (“Where section 90 reliance is at issue, we usually assume 
that it must be detrimental in some ‘substantial’ sense—probably economic . . . .”). 
 One not-so-contemporary exception is Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891). In 
Hamer, an uncle promised his nephew $5000 when the latter became twenty-one if he re-
frained from certain activities (drinking, gambling, etc.). Id. at 256. The nephew fulfilled 
the requirements and asked for payment upon turning twenty-one but agreed that his 
uncle would hold it for him with interest until he was old enough to use it responsibly. Id. 
The uncle died without paying (or repudiating), and the nephew successfully sued the es-
tate for payment. Id. at 256, 259. 
 This case exemplifies one of two fact patterns characteristic of many cases in which 
private promises are enforced. In the first category, as in Hamer, the defendant is not the 
promisor; rather, his or her estate is the promisor. In such cases, contract principles are 
arguably less at stake than trust and estate principles intended to ensure that the de-
ceased’s estate is distributed according to his or her intent. In the second category, dis-
cussed infra note 71, the promisor took active steps to formalize the promise in a way that 
suggested she intended to override any presumption of nonenforceability. 
 70.  See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. 
 71. Some famous cases involving such promises are Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 
(Neb. 1898) and Greiner v. Greiner, 293 P. 759 (Kan. 1930). In Ricketts, plaintiff, Scothorn, 
was given a note by her grandfather, Ricketts, for $2000. 77 N.W. at 365-66. He gave her 
what appears to have been a formally prepared note at her workplace, in reliance upon 
which she immediately ceased working. Id. at 366. She later resumed work with his con-
sent, but he never repudiated the promise, and all indications were that he intended to 
keep it. Id. However, he died before payment, and his estate refused payment. Id. Scothorn 
prevailed in a classic promissory estoppel case; she was awarded the full value of the note. 
Id. at 367. In Greiner, a mother promised her son land if he moved back. 293 P. at 760. He 
moved and made improvements but she refused to convey land and evicted him one year 
after he had moved. Id. at 759, 761. The court awarded specific performance, deeming 
monetary damages insufficient. Id. at 762. Cf. Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845) (where 
plaintiff moved at her brother-in-law’s invitation, but after giving her comfortable housing 
for two years, her brother-in-law removed her to an inferior situation, the court held that 
“the promise on the part of the defendant, was a mere gratuity, and that an action will not 
lie for its breach”). 
 These cases are not only dated but fall within the two types of exception noted supra 
note 69. In Ricketts, Scothorn sued her grandfather’s estate on the basis of a formal prom-
issory note. 77 N.W. at 365-66. In Greiner, the mother had already issued a deed for the 
property she promised to convey, and her promise was part of a larger plan to compensate 
those children which had been disinherited by their father. 293 P. at 760. 
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they do not sue when their romantic relationships end or when their 
friends cancel their social plans—most because it would be bizarre, 
others because they understand that they would not recover. 
 Given that promissory estoppel could, in principle, apply in so 
many private situations but is not applied so widely, the doctrine ef-
fectively operates to capture a wider range of economic bargains than 
an inflexible doctrine of consideration would allow.72 To the extent 
the doctrine recognizes noneconomic forms of reliance, or even eco-
nomic reliance within personal relationships, the arguments here 
should give us pause and reason to narrow its boundaries. Even 
where a promisor’s abandonment of a promise strikes us as unfair, 
we should strive to separate the personal wrong she thereby does her 
promisee from any systematic effects of those wrongs that might jus-
tify making contract law available as a means of redress. 
B.   Remedies for Breach of Private Promise 
 The more interesting ways in which contract doctrine might make 
room for private promise involve private promises that we are unwill-
ing to leave unregulated. There are private promises that we as a po-
litical community will enforce, not because we seek to give effect to 
the obligations arising from the personal relationship between the 
parties (including promissory obligations), but because the relation-
ship and its breach are of social consequence. There are several re-
spects in which the remedies awarded in such cases should deviate 
from the promisor’s obligations under private promissory norms. 
Most notably, no more than reliance damages should usually be 
awarded in order to redress the economic injury inflicted. In particu-
lar, the state should refrain from coercing conduct that is materially 
equivalent to performance. Neither party should be indifferent be-
tween performance and the available remedy. 
 Contract law should impose liability in a manner that advances 
the special public interest in the agreement, but in its specific rules 
of excuse and remedy, it should deliberately depart from private 
promissory norms—and by implication, the parties’ intentions—in or-
der to make it possible for parties not to comply with moral norms 
even while meeting their legal obligations. In certain contexts, it is 
appropriate for courts to interpret the parties’ agreement—especially 
the consequences of breach—in a way that is intentionally incon-
sistent with those terms contemplated by the parties. This would be 
                                                 
 72. This is consistent with Farber and Matheson’s arguments about the development 
of promissory estoppel. See infra note 102 and accompanying text. 
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an alternative to either majoritarian or penalty defaults.73 It is also 
inconsistent with the form of accommodation advocated by Shiffrin. 
 As Shiffrin has pointed out, promissory norms diverge from con-
tractual ones in a number of respects.74 A strategy of insisting on the 
difference between contract and promise would advise in favor of con-
tractual norms that diverge from their promissory counterparts. Sev-
eral examples follow. 
 First, moral rules of promise generally require that one perform a 
promise that is in the parties’ combined interests. If circumstances 
have changed such that both the cost of performance and the promi-
see’s reliance are greater than initially anticipated, but performance 
is still reasonable, then the promise is binding. By contrast, contract 
rules appropriately limit promisor’s obligations to foreseeable reli-
ance and, especially where the promise was not part of an exchange, 
courts are likely to be sympathetic to a claim that changed circum-
stances excuse performance. 
 Second, promissory norms take into account all aspects of the 
promisee’s interests, including nonmonetary interests that are diffi-
cult to quantify reliably. By contrast, contract norms restrict them-
selves exclusively to the monetary aspects of promise.75 We might go 
further, however, and ask judges to conscientiously exclude evidence 
of emotional injury that is not relevant to the application of contract 
doctrine. That will make it easier for judges and juries to avoid esti-
mating damages more generously where a legal claim corresponds 
with a moral one.76 
 Third, as Shiffrin suggests, moral norms may call for punitive re-
actions.77 But punitive damages are generally unavailable in contract.78 
                                                 
 73. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Eco-
nomic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) (introducing and distinguishing the 
concepts of majoritarian and penalty defaults). 
 74. Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 719-727. Perhaps because I am concerned only with 
those promises that take place within personal relationships, my brief account of the doc-
trinal divergence between contract and promise differs from Shiffrin’s.  
 75. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (1981) (excluding recovery for 
emotional disturbance in most cases). 
 76. One context in which this takes place systematically is divorce. On the approach 
set forth here, fault may not be relevant for the division of assets upon divorce, given that 
any enforcement of the marital bargain embodied in alimony and other asset division poli-
cies is or should be intended to serve social policies and not actually to enforce the bargain. 
The only types of fault that may be relevant are ones that resemble torts, such that the 
moment of asset division is taken as an opportunity to compensate for tort-like conduct 
that cannot be more effectively remedied elsewhere in the legal system. Cf. Harry D. 
Krause, On the Danger of Allowing Marital Fault to Re-Emerge in the Guise of Torts, 73 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1355 (1998) (discussing trends in the treatment of fault in divorce law 
and how it might properly be taken into account in asset division). 
 77. Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 710. 
 78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981) (excluding punitive dam-
ages for breach of contract except where the conduct is also tortious). 
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 Each of these differences helps to express in law the moral differ-
ence between contract and private promise. But the two hearts of 
promise, reliance on the promise and performance of it, are still 
tainted so long as promisor and/or promisee are given reasons by vir-
tue of contract to behave as they would in the private practice of 
promise. The legal remedy for breach of private promise should di-
verge not just from promissory norms but also from the legal reme-
dies available for the ordinary contractual promise. 
 To reflect the difference between contract and private promise, the 
remedy for private promise must fall short of the compensatory dam-
ages usually offered in contract. I will not attempt here to give a full 
account of the debate regarding the expectation remedy. Suffice it to 
say, there are a number of reasons why expectation damages may be 
preferable as the usual remedy in contract, at least as an alternative 
to reliance damages (the choice between expectation damages and 
specific performance is less clear). Expectation damages incentivize 
promisors to breach if, and only if, their resources are more valued by 
a third party than by the promisee, thus fostering allocative efficien-
cy.79 Both in rewarding risk-taking in market transactions and ensur-
ing that resources are deployed by those who can and will pay the 
most for them, expectation damages facilitate commercial exchange. 
Perhaps because these reasons for awarding expectation damages are 
most compelling in a commercial context, there has been a tendency 
to award expectation damages in commercial contract cases and reli-
ance damages in noncommercial cases.80 Because private promises 
are less likely to be bilateral, they are more likely to be litigated un-
der promissory estoppel, and promissory estoppel may often give rise 
only to reliance damages—at least where it is employed outside of a 
commercial context.81 
 There is widespread disagreement on what damages are actually 
awarded under promissory estoppel and whether courts care about 
reliance or commercial context.82 Which damages are awarded in a 
                                                 
 79. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 55, at 1265.  
 80. See L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Dam-
ages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 69 (1936). Markovits has argued that the moral norms of promise 
independently justify the award of expectation damages. See Markovits, supra note 2, at 
1497-1511. But even if that is the case, the argument here suggests that the legal remedy 
should be something other than expectation damages. 
 81. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981) (allowing for expectation 
damages to be limited “as justice requires” and thus affording courts enormous discretion).  
 82. See Benjamin F. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations of the 
Doctrine, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 459 (1950) (arguing damages should be limited to reliance); 
Robert Hillman, Questioning the “New Consensus” on Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical 
and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 580, 601 (1998) (courts flexibly award either 
expectation or reliance damages); Eric M. Holmes, Restatement of Promissory Estoppel, 32 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 263 (1996) (showing some but not all jurisdictions limit damages to 
reliance). But see Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Con-
tract Law and the “Invisible Handshake,” 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 905 (1985) (discussed 
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given case may depend most on whether reliance or expectation is 
more easily calculated, which in turn will depend in no small part on 
whether plaintiff or defendant has done a better job marshalling the 
relevant facts. Nevertheless, the moral separateness of contract and 
promise offers an independent, affirmative reason, in cases where 
public policy dictates that some remedy be afforded and it is feasible 
to award either expectation or reliance damages, to limit damages for 
breach of private promise to reliance.83 In commercial contexts, the 
fact of reliance may render a promise enforceable as such; in these cases, 
expectation damages recognize that reliance operates as a substitute—
if not a marker—for consideration. But where we have reasons to 
regulate private promise but also have reason, as I argue here, not to 
enforce those promises, reliance damages acknowledge the public policy 
interest in protecting certain classes of promisees without rendering 
the promises enforceable in the manner of a commercial promise.84 
 One example of a situation where reliance damages may be ap-
propriate is upon breach of a promise to marry. Neil Williams has 
described a trend away from awarding any damages at all, as modern 
courts have become reluctant to impose contract law, or the “morals 
of business[,] on personal relationships.”85 Even judges who did 
award damages departed from traditional rules of contract, for which 
such cases gained still further notoriety. But as Williams explains, 
the prevailing expectation that a bride’s parents will pay for her 
                                                                                                                  
infra at note 102 and accompanying text); Michael B. Kelly, The Phantom Reliance Interest 
in Contract Damages, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1755 (1992); W. David Slawson, The Role of Reli-
ance in Contract Damages, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 197, 198-99 (1990) (finding expectation 
damages are usually awarded); see also Mary E. Becker, Promissory Estoppel Damages, 16 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 131, 151-52 (1987) (rejecting reliance limitation on damages); Edward 
Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 111 (1991) (same). 
 83. There may be reasons to lower the damages available upon breach of private 
promise even below reliance. Legal regulation of personal relationships and the promises to 
which those relationships give rise should not create barriers to exit. In many cases, reli-
ance damages are not so prohibitively high that the risk of unduly raising the costs of exit 
offset the interest in redressing the actual injury to the promisee. But in some cases, as 
where the nonbreaching party is of substantially greater means than the breaching party, 
damages may need to be further limited to lower exit costs for the breaching party. 
 84. Cf. Yorio & Thel, supra note 82, at 113, 161-62. Yorio and Thel argue that expecta-
tion damages are normally awarded in promissory estoppel cases and that “the prospect of 
definite and substantial reliance generally required under Section 90 . . . screens for seri-
ously considered promises” much in the same way that consideration is a proxy for 
thoughtful promises in a contractual setting. Id. at 113. The award of reliance damages for 
breach of regulated private promises is consistent with their point that the award of only 
reliance damages would not really render those promises enforceable but “merely to com-
pensate for reliance.” Id. at 161. My point is that our aim should be to address the harm 
that motivates legal treatment without enforcing the promises per se. But while I agree 
that “[w]hat distinguishes enforceable from unenforceable promises is the quality of the 
commitment made by the promisor,” id. at 162, and not the provable fact of inducement, I 
argue that the relevant characteristic of a promise stems from the nature of the relation-
ship within which it is made, not the seriousness with which it is undertaken. 
 85. Neil G. Williams, What To Do When There’s No “I Do”: A Model for Awarding 
Damages Under Promissory Estoppel, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1019, 1039 (1995).  
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wedding, and the fact that wedding costs usually exceed the value of 
engagement rings, means that courts’ refusal to award damages in 
these cases systematically disadvantages women (who no doubt are 
disadvantaged when their parents spend large sums to no avail on 
their behalf).86 Attending to this injustice while refusing to confuse a 
promise to marry with a contractual promise argues in favor of a re-
liance award (as advocated by Williams),87 which addresses the inju-
ry but does not conflate private and legal promise in doing so.  
 Stephen Smith makes an analogous argument in support of the 
expectation award in contract cases. He argues that “[b]y limiting 
itself to awarding compensatory damages (in most cases), the law 
intrudes to the minimum extent necessary to protect the material 
interests that the law can, and should, protect, leaving the maximum 
space possible for the nonmaterial,” what he calls “the bond-
creation . . . side of contracting[,] to flourish.”88 The logic of his argu-
ment is similar to mine, in that both our arguments seek to make it 
possible for promisors to demonstrate their private reasons for per-
formance and thus preserve a separate moral space for promising 
outside the law.89 But Smith applies this logic not just to private 
promises but to all promises and thus endorses expectation damages 
as the default contract remedy instead of specific performance. Con-
sistent with prevailing theory, he takes contract to be an instance of 
promise and thus believes not just private but legal promises too 
“lead to a special relationship and help to create bonds between the 
relevant parties.”90 
 I have argued that private promise serves this function only inas-
much as it is kept separate and apart from contract. Although Smith 
appreciates the importance of voluntary promise-keeping, his start-
ing point—namely, his failure to adequately distinguish the character 
of private and legal promise—does not allow the point to develop to 
its rightful conclusion: that the performance of private promise 
should be entirely voluntary.91 In those cases where the injury or 
injustice resulting from breach of private promise is too grave to go 
                                                 
 86. Id. at 1067. 
 87. Id. at 1047 (“Modern marriages are . . . tantamount to contractual relationships 
that are terminable at will, and exchanges of promises to marry can be likened to exchanges 
of promises to enter into at-will employment arrangements. . . . [T]he basis for granting a 
remedy for the breach of a nuptial promise should not be the aggrieved party’s expectancy, 
but the costs incurred by the aggrieved party in relying on a broken nuptial promise.”). 
 88. Stephen A. Smith, Performance, Punishment and the Nature of Contractual Obli-
gation, 60 MOD. L. REV. 360, 363 (1997). 
 89. Id. at 370. 
 90. Id. at 368. 
 91. Kimel rejects Smith’s argument for the same reason. He argues that the bonding 
function Smith ascribes to contract is off the mark; promise, not contract, serves that func-
tion. KIMEL, PROMISE, supra note 5, at 98-99. 
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unaddressed, a more modest remedy than expectation damages is 
usually adequate. 
 Reliance damages should be awarded only where special public 
policy reasons motivate the court’s enforcement of promise. In other 
words, reliance damages are appropriate where promises are en-
forced in spite of their private status, not because they take place 
within a rich moral practice of private promise. I do not suggest that 
it is easy to identify legal rules that leave adequate room for moral 
norms but also effectively serve those public interests which compel 
legal regulation in the first place.92 My point is that allowing moral 
norms a separate sphere cuts against incorporating them readily into 
the law, even where we have separate public reasons for enforcing 
promises. We have not made a categorical choice between reliance 
and expectation damages in the application of promissory estoppel. 
In maneuvering within the flexibility that the doctrine allows, we 
should adopt as among our various purposes the separation of private 
and legal promise. 
III.   FALSE PRIVATE PROMISE AND THE EXPANSION OF CONTRACT 
 I have claimed that private promise, unlike contract, takes place 
within personal relationships, and that to the extent possible, legal 
rules should avoid replicating private promissory norms. The thrust 
of this argument is that promise-types should correspond to relation-
ship-types. Just as it is morally problematic for contract to govern 
personal relationships, so too is it problematic for private promise to 
govern essentially impersonal relationships. 
 Where personalism is unconstrained by law, it has a tendency to 
expand to fill in all unclaimed corners of our lives. Historically, this 
expansion has been accompanied with gross inequities. The most 
grossly oppressive status relationships—e.g., dictators, feudal lords 
and slave holders presenting themselves as father figures—might be 
recognized as ostensibly personal relationships that were the oppo-
site of personal: they failed to properly recognize one party to the re-
                                                 
 92. While detailed exploration of the issue is outside the scope of this Article, my 
treatment of private promise suggests that we should systematically distinguish fiduciary 
relationships recognized for regulatory reasons, such as those imposed on corporate officers 
and directors, on the one hand, and fiduciary relationships arising from real, personal rela-
tionships, on the other. A conflict of interest may give rise to a fiduciary duty as a mecha-
nism by which to regulate the apparent conflict of interest. A personal relationship gives 
rise to fiduciary duties in order to offset the vulnerability created by a perceived unity of 
interests. Thus, in the conflict-of-interest cases, it may be appropriate to emphasize process 
requirements (e.g., disclosures, preapproval, open bidding) and make it difficult to immun-
ize a transaction by attempting to show that it ultimately served the interests of the bene-
ficiary. In the personal relationship cases, we might be more flexible in allowing the fiduci-
ary to show either that she complied with certain process requirements or that the transac-
tion’s outcome was favorable to the beneficiary. 
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lationship as persons bearing the range of interests and rights asso-
ciated with legal personhood. 
 The rise of liberalism and the corresponding rise of free markets is 
well-documented. One important aspect of these related develop-
ments has been the rise of free labor markets, in which individuals 
sell their own labor at market prices. Whatever the disadvantages of 
such labor markets, few would return to the earlier regime in which 
workers exchanged their labor for land use or bare subsistence. 
Those exchanges were mired in complex personalistic relationships in 
which noneconomic motives were at least outwardly imputed to both 
employer and employee. We should see it as an achievement of the 
liberal market economy that labor no longer takes place within the 
confines of such ostensibly personal relationships. 
 To the extent we do celebrate that achievement, we should be 
simultaneously worried by the fact that employment relationships 
are still only partially situated within the world of contract.93 In par-
ticular, employers continue to make any number of nonlegally bind-
ing commitments to employees, and their expectations of employees 
often also tend to exceed the legal obligations of those employees. For 
example, “[e]mployers make, and workers rely upon, oral commit-
ments to pay pensions, even though these commitments are often 
held to be unenforceable under federal pension law.”94 Employers 
                                                 
 93. As noted above, Kimel has argued that, “as a facilitator of personal detachment,” 
contract promotes “freedom from dependence upon the very institution—personal relation-
ship—in the enhancement of which lies the intrinsic value of the practice’s nonlegal equiv-
alent.” KIMEL, PROMISE, supra note 5, at 80. But instead of moving from this point to the 
conclusion that we should use contract to help free certain groups from dependence on 
personal relationship, who historically have been so dependent, Kimel instead suggests 
that relational contracts, properly understood, are “hardly contractual” or “relational to the 
point of not being contractual.” Id. at 83. He also suggests that “[t]here is of course nothing 
wrong in parties deciding to mould and pursue their relations in a way that renders formal 
contract entirely (or almost entirely) insignificant, and to eschew altogether the option of 
legal enforceability, alongside any number of other facilities or mechanisms with which the 
legal system furnishes them as parties to contract.” Id. 
 94. David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. 
REV. 373, 377 (1990). Courts appear more open to enforcing promises of pension on which 
the employee quite obviously relied. Compare Katz v. Danny Dare, Inc., 610 S.W.2d 121 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1980), with Hayes v. Plantations Steel Co., 438 A.2d 1091 (R.I. 1982). Katz 
retired from Dare, whose president was Katz’s brother-in-law, with promise of pension. 
Dare had threatened to fire Katz if he did not retire, but ultimately Katz retired voluntari-
ly after Dare increased its pension offer. Katz, 610 S.W.2d at 123. The Katz court held that 
the promise of pension, affirmed by the Board of Directors’ resolution, was enforceable. Id. 
at 126. Hayes, by contrast, announced his retirement, expecting a pension, and one week 
before his retirement had a conversation with an officer and stockholder of the company 
who promised that the company “would take care of” Hayes. Hayes, 438 A.2d at 1093. No 
amounts were specified and no formal provision for a pension was made. Id. Hayes would 
periodically visit and inquire how long the payments could continue. Id. They were discon-
tinued upon a takeover of the company. Id. The state supreme court reversed the holding of 
the trial court, holding that Hayes did not rely or exchange consideration for the promise of 
a pension. Id. at 1097. The tenuous case for reliance in Hayes may appear to validate the 
court’s decision, but in fact the two cases are more similar than different. Katz’s real indi-
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make promises regarding their hiring, firing, and other policies with 
the clear purpose of either retaining workers or preventing their un-
ionization, even though those promises are accompanied by language 
that usually renders them unenforceable.95 
 These informal, nonbinding promises are made in other contexts 
as well—usually in contexts where one party has substantially less 
bargaining power or less relevant information than the other.96 
Commercial promisors regularly make representations about their 
products and services which they do not put in writing and have writ-
ings which effectively undo the effect of whatever oral representa-
tions or promises were made. 
 The extralegal status of these promises is in tension with the 
arm’s length nature of the relationships within which they are made. 
True private promises cause private promisors to give equal or great-
er weight to the relevant interests of their promisees. False private 
promises do no such thing. In fact, they deprive promisees of even the 
benefits of contract, the only kind of commitment normally attainable 
in an arm’s length relationship. We saw earlier that while the obliga-
tions of private promise were in some sense more extensive than 
those of contractual promise, the private promisor is entitled to exer-
cise greater judgment as to what conduct best serves the joint ends of 
the promisor and promisee. By contrast, a contractual promisor’s rel-
                                                                                                                  
vidual reliance on the pension promise was limited since he could have been terminated in 
any event. The true grounds for enforcing the promise is that Dare was able to lose Katz 
without having to terminate him, which may have set a poor signal to other employees 
after Katz’s long service, especially since Katz had become a burdensome employee only 
after sustaining an injury while in service to Dare. A similar benefit was likely achieved by 
Plantation Steel when it promised Hayes a pension. Because employment relationships are 
not personal ones, even when good will appears to motivate an employer’s promise, the 
promise should be enforced in light of the multiple interests affected by what transpires 
within those relationships.  
 95. See William B. Gould IV, The Idea of the Job as Property in Contemporary Ameri-
ca: The Legal and Collective Bargaining Framework, 1986 BYU L. REV. 885, 903 (1986) 
(citing cases). 
 96. The fact that false private promises are usually made in the context of disparate 
bargaining power is of not only moral but also economic relevance. Avery Katz has shown 
that “the efficiency of promissory estoppel in preliminary negotiations depends in large 
part on which party holds the bulk of the bargaining power ex post.” Avery Katz, When 
Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 
105 YALE L.J. 1249, 1256-57 (1996). Because the party with bargaining power will reap the 
benefits of optimal reliance, she should be held to any offer she makes to the weaker party 
so that she makes only those offers which will induce optimal reliance. Id. at 1257. Katz 
observes that “[t]he strongest case for applying promissory estoppel to precontractual nego-
tiations may be in the context of labor contracts . . . . Except when the employee has some 
unique skill or professional knowledge, the employer is much more likely to hold the bar-
gaining power.” Id. at 1301-02. While Katz makes this point in the context of preliminary 
negotiations, it applies to other promises made by employers to employees where the em-
ployer, by varying the content of its promise and the scope of information extended to its 
employees, controls the degree to which employees rely on its promises and can expect to 
reap the rewards of that reliance. 
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atively narrow obligations are more constrained and not subject to 
easy revision based on change of circumstance. A false private prom-
ise entails the worst of both worlds for the promisee: the priority of 
the promisor’s interests and flexibility as to the conditions and terms 
of performance. 
 What I refer to as false private promises are normally made with-
in hierarchical relationships in which the stronger party seeks a ben-
efit from the promisee and can secure that benefit now through a 
nonbinding promise of future performance. While we might be able to 
conceptualize the value of a false private promise along a continuum 
that includes binding promises, this discussion is intended to show 
why in fact there is something especially insidious about false private 
promises. That is, one might be tempted to equate a binding promise 
(90% probability of performance) of $100 with a nonbinding promise 
(45% probability of performance) of $200. But the false private promise 
of $200 is not just worth less because of a lower probability of per-
formance. It is morally repugnant from a political point of view be-
cause, by incorrectly recognizing the false private promise as a private 
promise, the law treats the parties as though they are in a personal 
relationship when they are not. In doing so it denigrates relation-
ships in which interests are genuinely unified and unwittingly cele-
brates hierarchical ones in which one party’s interests are systemati-
cally discounted. In confusing hierarchy for its opposite, the law mistakes 
conditions of moral oppression for conditions of moral flourishing. 
Even if contract law is not the domain in which those morally oppres-
sive conditions are most effectively attacked, contract law is at least 
one site in which the law may refuse to give effect to a symptom of 
that oppression. Refusing to enforce false private promises may simp-
ly result in binding promises of performance that are of lower face 
value. But even if bringing downward promises into the fold of con-
tract does not make them more economically valuable to promisees, it 
has the noninstrumental virtue of taking them for what they are. 
 There is another related argument for enforcing false private 
promise, i.e., recognizing them as contractual. Enforcing these prom-
ises may serve the public interest, including distributive justice.97 
Where enforcement of a promise interferes with private promise and 
undermines the value of a personal relationship, there is a competing 
reason not to enforce that promise. Here, the opposite is true; we 
have independent reasons (discussed above) for treating false private 
promises as contractual. But even if one does not recognize the non-
                                                 
 97. These two arguments for making false private promise more difficult are in some 
ways similar to two-pronged attacks on inequality. False private promise is wrong in itself 
and also detrimentally impacts distributive justice. Excessive economic inequality is wrong 
in itself and also detracts from other political moral goods, such as a democratic culture 
and political equality. 
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instrumental reasons for calling out false private promises as false, 
so long as one recognizes independent instrumental reasons for en-
forcing these promises, there is a valuable lesson to be learned from 
the difference between private promise and contract. We can avoid 
the mistake of refraining from regulating these ostensibly private 
relationships on the grounds that the promises were not intended to 
be binding. For the reasons discussed in Part I, the nature of the re-
lationship within which a promise is made, and not just the intention 
of the promisor, is important in setting the default interpretive rules 
as to enforceability. The intentions of the parties are also important, 
and so we would not want to prohibit this unsavory class of promise 
altogether. But the argument presented here gives us reason to make 
it more difficult to make a false private promise.98 
 We should not treat as dispositive even our best guess as to 
whether the parties intended a promise to be legally binding because 
often the parties’ intentions are not consistent, and to defer to the 
party who fails to form an intention to be bound is likely to systemat-
ically disadvantage certain parties.99 The problem is not solved, 
though it is helped, by referring only to reasonably inferred inten-
tions. It is appropriate to ask whether a party spoke and acted in a 
way that made it reasonable for the other party to believe that she 
intended to be bound. But the inquiry cannot end there. Realistically, 
it is not reasonable to believe that an employer who makes certain 
formal commitments and explicitly makes others in a separate form 
intends both to have the same status. The legal standard for the rea-
sonableness of the inference that the promise was intended to be 
binding should turn not just on the likely intentions of the promisor 
or even the promisee’s probable perception of those intentions but on 
how difficult we want it to be for a party to have his cake and eat it 
too, i.e., how difficult we want it to be for a party to make a promise 
but avoid its legal enforceability.100 In certain contexts (personal rela-
tionships) we should make it very, very easy—it should be difficult to 
                                                 
 98. Notably, the argument here is not that enforcing ostensibly nonbinding promises 
by employers to employees is necessary to sustain the relationship that exists between 
them. The idea is precisely the opposite: enforcing these otherwise false private promises is 
necessary to upset the insidious aspects of private ordering between unequals. There may 
be order without law, but there is no justice. 
 99. Cf. Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986) 
(advocating reliance on evidence of parties’ intentions as to legality to decide whether 
agreements are legally binding). 
 100. Randy Barnett and Mary Baker ask, “How can enforcement turn on the reasona-
bleness of reliance when the reasonableness of reliance will necessarily depend on enforce-
ability?” Randy E. Barnett & Mary E. Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel, Con-
tract Formalities, and Misrepresentations, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 443, 446-47 (1987). In re-
forming the scope of enforceable promises, the reasonableness of reliance should depend on 
the context in which it was made, i.e., whether promises made in the context of the kind of 
relationship at hand should usually be enforceable.  
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make one’s promise binding.101 In other contexts, as in the employ-
ment context, it should be very, very hard—it should be very difficult 
to make a private promise to an employee because those promises are 
usually not embedded in a genuine personal relationship character-
ized by unified interests. 
 This approach is consistent with others’ recommendations and ob-
servations. Farber and Matheson have suggested that the new rule of 
promissory estoppel is that “any promise made in furtherance of an 
economic activity is enforceable.”102 The doctrine would go a long way 
toward eliminating false private promises in the employment context. 
Indeed, in support of their interpretation of the doctrine, most of 
their examples are promises by employers to employees. 
 Farber and Matheson emphasize that employment relations take 
place over a period of time and that it is therefore difficult to tran-
scribe the bargain in a traditional contract.103 Those kinds of long-
term contracts are called relational, and of course it is true that long-
term dealings produce a kind of relationship. But it is misleading to 
call these contracts relational, because it suggests that it is the fact of 
the relationship that makes them special. But the reality is that long-
term dealings between hierarchically situated parties do not normally 
result in anything importantly like a close personal relationship.104 
                                                 
 101. This is generally consistent with the rule advanced by Randy Barnett, albeit on 
other grounds. See Randy E. Barnett, The Death of Reliance, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 
(1996). He suggests the following restatement of the rule governing enforceability of non-
commercial promises:  
(1) A promise not made in furtherance of an economic activity is binding if the 
promise is in writing that is signed by the promisor and either (a) is under seal, 
or (b) recites a nominal consideration, or (c) contains an expression of intention 
to be legally bound, or (d) is also signed at the same time by the promisee. (2) A 
promise not made in furtherance of an economic activity that fails to meet the 
requirements of (1) is not ordinarily binding.  
Id. at 532. 
 102. Farber & Matheson, supra note 82, at 905; see also Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 
832-33 (“Under modern contract law, there is a marked trend to make all commercial 
promises enforceable, even if they are not bargain promises. Partly this is because many 
commercial promises that do not appear to be bargains turn out to have a bargain element 
when properly analyzed.”). The doctrine of waiver could also be tailored to employment in 
order to combat false private promising. 
 That promises made in an economic context are usually made for some reciprocal 
benefit does not imply that all such promises should be enforced. Not all agreements must 
be enforced. Enforcing certain agreements is a political decision based on public policy. The 
point is that neither the absence of intention to be legally bound nor the fact that the prom-
ise was not one side of an explicit bargain should be treated as a dispositive reason not to 
enforce the promise. 
 103. Farber & Matheson, supra note 82, at 925. 
 104. Of course, this is a generalization. But I would argue that, outside of families, 
hierarchy impedes the development of a genuine personal relationship in which the parties 
routinely and voluntarily give the other’s interests weight comparable to, let alone greater 
than, their own. Employer and employee may share certain interests, such as the success 
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While so-called relational contracts are importantly different from 
one-off contracts and present contract law with distinct challenges, 
those challenges are not like the challenges presented by contracts 
between parties who really are in a personal relationship. Indeed, the 
greatest challenge posed by so-called relational contracts is precisely to 
avoid having them function as though they were personal relationships. 
 Courts seem to be moving in the direction of enforcing promises by 
employers that would earlier have been nonbinding. In some cases, 
courts merely reject an employer’s formally manifest intention in fa-
vor of workers’ reasonable inferences about the terms of his employ-
ment from the employer’s statements or behavior. These courts have 
found “enforceable commitments in ‘personnel policies or practices of 
the employer, the employee’s longevity of service, actions or commu-
nications by the employer reflecting assurances of continued em-
ployment, and the practices of the industry in which the employee is 
engaged.’ ”105 But in some cases courts have gone further to hold, as 
the above approach would suggest, “that neither the employee’s nor 
the employer’s subjective intent determines whether commitments in 
handbooks are enforceable. These courts sweep away the evidentiary 
and conceptual difficulties of showing intent by presuming that the 
worker has relied upon the commitment and by then equating reli-
ance with bargain.”106 
 In a welcome development, some courts have enforced promises 
made even to prospective employees. In particular, numerous courts 
have held that a promise of employment, on which an employee re-
lies, may give rise to damages, should the employee be disinvited be-
fore beginning work.107 These cases recognize that employers intend 
                                                                                                                  
of the firm or the well-being of a client, but this is best regarded as an overlap between 
otherwise distinct interest sets. 
 105. Charny, supra note 94, at 380-81 (citing numerous cases).  
 106. Id. at 381. Charny argues that workers would not be put so much at the mercy of 
employers if employers’ powers were effectively constrained outside the law through repu-
tational interests, fear of employees quitting when treated unfairly, and through social or 
psychic losses associated with inequity. Id. at 396-97. But Charny’s own later discussion 
reveals the problems with those constraints. 
 Promissory estoppel, with its apparent emphasis on reliance, is more generally the 
doctrinal mechanism by which employer promises are most easily enforced. “Originally 
seen as particularly suited for use in noncommercial settings, such as situations involving 
intra-family promises and charitable subscriptions, its application was eventually extend-
ed—over some strong objections—into commercial settings as well.” Knapp, supra note 69, 
at 1198. As Farber, Matheson and others have argued (and I argue now, on other grounds), 
it is better suited to its new territory. 
 107. See, e.g., Hunter v. Hayes, 533 P.2d 952, 953 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); Grouse v. 
Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn. 1981); Goff-Hamel v. Obstetricians & 
Gynecologists, P.C., 588 N.W.2d 798 (Neb. 1999) (discussing numerous cases in which per-
spective employees recovered through promissory estoppel). In Grouse, Group Health Plan 
offered Grouse a position as pharmacist. 306 N.W.2d at 115. Grouse accepted and informed 
Group Health that he would need to give his present employer two weeks notice. Id. Group 
Health confirmed that Grouse had in fact quit. Id. In the meantime, Grouse declined an-
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prospective employees to quit their previous positions and take other 
steps in order to make themselves available for employment; those 
steps operate to employers’ benefit. The fact that they usually take 
place outside of any formal contractual relationship and are usually 
expected to lead only to an at-will employment relationship does not 
justify treating the promise as a casual or informal one, which the 
law will not recognize. 
 The slow and ongoing depersonalization of the employment rela-
tionship throws American labor law into positive relief. One of its 
important achievements has been that it not only collectivizes work-
ers and thereby increases their bargaining power and ability to moni-
tor their employers, but also encourages the union to adopt a wholly 
institutional role vis-à-vis employers. The National Labor Relations 
Act institutes rules of bargaining that regulate employers’ speech 
more strictly than where employers speak to employees directly out-
side of a union context (or at least, outside of a union context, any 
regulations on employers’ speech are unlikely to be sanctioned). This 
makes false private promise less likely, as employers are not permit-
ted to make many of the generic threats and promises which they 
might normally make in order to appease workers contemplating un-
ionization or labor unrest.108 Moreover, while there is controversy 
over whether unions should be limited to the wholly adversarial role 
which they are required to assume under current labor law, my ar-
gument illuminates some subtle benefits of the adversarial nature of 
collective bargaining in the United States. The adversarial system 
makes it easier to call out paternalistic rhetoric and to monitor and 
demand performance of employer claims. It also makes it more diffi-
                                                                                                                  
other offer. Group Health hired someone else because it did not obtain a reference for 
Grouse. Id. The court awarded reliance damages: “The conclusion we reach does not imply 
that an employer will be liable whenever he discharges an employee whose term of em-
ployment is at will. What we do hold is that under the facts of this case the appellant had a 
right to assume he would be given a good faith opportunity to perform his duties to the 
satisfaction of respondent once he was on the job.” Id. at 116. 
 Damages in these cases are limited to reliance, which may be appropriate since, un-
like in the other employer-employee situations discussed here, the employee has not con-
ferred a direct benefit on the employer through her work. While it strikes some as anoma-
lous that the employee would be compensated even for reliance interests prior to employ-
ment, the marginal degree of reliance is often greatest immediately prior to beginning em-
ployment, since the worker normally has to leave her previous position and make other 
major accommodations to make it feasible to begin employment (e.g., move). As the court in 
Grouse held, in principle, promises of employment may give rise to damages even within an 
existing employment relationship. Id. 
 108. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969) (holding that “an em-
ployer is free to communicate to his employees any of his general views . . . so long as the 
communications do not contain a ‘threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit’ ”); see also 
Spring Indus., Inc., 332 N.L.R.B. 40 (2000) (affirming recommendation that election results 
be set aside where employer threatened that plan would close if unionized); Dal-Tex Opti-
cal Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782, 1786-87 (1962) (holding employer violated Section 8(a)(1) of the 
NLRA by making threats and promising certain benefits). 
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cult to co-opt workers’ representatives in personalistic relationships 
with those with whom they are supposed to bargain. The interests of 
workers and their employers overlap but are not aligned, and the 
arm’s length bargaining promoted by the NLRA regime allows this 
truth to frame negotiation of the employment relationship and be-
havior within it.  
IV.   CONCLUSION 
 The current relationship between contract and promise in legal 
theory does not reflect the triumph of liberalism in our political cul-
ture. Notwithstanding valuable insights into the challenges inherent 
in any attempt to demarcate public from private, our political culture 
is committed to recognizing some boundaries. Contract law should be 
enlisted in the effort to ensure that various practices end up on the 
appropriate side of the line. 
 My primary aim in this Article has been to detail the tension be-
tween contract and private promise and to argue that contract is not 
an instance of promise as we commonly understand the practice of 
promising. Private promise and contract are both sites for moral 
agency, and both practices have moral value. But the value of the 
former lies in our capacity to cultivate personal relationships that 
redefine the good we each pursue. By contrast, contract is a valuable 
site for the exercise of public virtue where we can pursue our own 
ends effectively only to the extent disinterested others can be per-
suaded to do and give up things useful to us, which in turn requires 
us to take their (still separate) interests into account. 
 Once we have disentangled private and legal promise, we can begin 
to adjust the boundaries and defaults of contract law accordingly. Be-
cause private promises are private, the law should make it relatively 
costly for parties to bring the law to bear on such commitments. 
When public policy dictates affording a legal remedy for their breach, 
the remedy should deviate from both the obligations imposed by pri-
vate promissory norms and the remedy usually awarded in commer-
cial cases. In particular, reliance damages will more often be appro-
priate in promissory estoppel cases outside of economic relationships. 
 Because employment relationships are not personal relationships, 
promises made by employers to employees should be legally binding 
in the usual case. Just as parties should have to go out of their way to 
make a private promise legally binding, legal defaults should make it 
relatively onerous for employers to avoid legal consequence when 
they make promises to their employees. While many balk at the lib-
eral agenda when it comes to limiting state intervention in the pri-
vate sphere, on the eradication of the vestiges of pseudo-personalism 
in the labor market, there may be more agreement. 
